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The Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the Association convened at 10:00 A.M. 
on Saturday, April 1, 1978, in Shipp Hall Lounge at Wofford College in Spartan-
burg, South Carolina. Over 100 members and guests were present. President 
Richard Gannaway presided, and Joab M. Lesesne, Jr., president of the college, 
and Lewis P. Jones, chairman of the department of history, welcomed the 
Association. 
There were two morning sessions. A United States session in Shipp Hall 
Lounge was convened by Hewitt Adams, Clemson, and featured papers on "South 
Carolina Leadership in the Southern Unification Movement, 1848-49" by Thelma 
Jennings of Middle Tennessee State University, and "W. W. Boyce, A Leader of 
the Southern Peace Movement" by Roger Leemhuis of Clemson. This discussants 
were James Gettys, Erskine, and Larry Nelson, Francis Marion. A European 
session met in Burwell Campus Center, with Jamie W. Moore, The Citadel, pre-
siding. William J. Brockington, USC-Aiken, read a paper on "The Unionist 
Party and Irish Home Rule," and William J. Lavery, Furman, read a paper enti-
tled "The Chicherin and Litvinov Missions to Great Britain, 1917-18." William 
R. Ferrell, USC-Sumter, and Birdsall S. Viault, Winthrop, commented. 
The Luncheon meeting in Burwell Campus featured a slide report by Marvin 
and Mary Kathryn Cann, Lander, on "The Ninety Six Excavations." The Business 
Meeting followed. The minutes were approved, and the Secretary-Treasurer made 







The officers for 1978-79 were elected by acclamation: 
President: Joseph Wightman (USC-Conway) 
Vice President: Hewitt Adams (Clemson) 
Secretary-Treasurer: A. V. Huff, Jr. (Furman) 
Exe cu ti ve Cammi ttee: John Edmunds (USC-Spartanburg) 
Editor, PMc.eecung6: James 0. Farmer (USC-Lancaster) 
i 
The president announced the following meeting places of the Association: 
Clemson (1979), The Citadel (1980), University of South Carolina, Coluui>ia 
(1981). 
John Edmunds presided over the afternoon session. Daniel W. Hollis, USC, 
read a paper on "Cole L. Blease, 1919-24," and Winfrid B. Moore, Jr., spoke on 
"Soul of the South: James F. Byrnes and the Racial Issue in American Politics, 
1914-,:.1." The discussants were Ernest M. Lander, Clemson, and Edmtmd Drago, 
College of Charleston. 
At 4 P. M. James Farmer introduced a film, "A Place in Time." And at 
5 P.M. Professor and Mrs. L, P. Jones entertained the Association at their 
home. The Dinner meeting convened at 6:15 P.M. and Neill Macaulay, lhliversity 
of Florida, presented an address, "Cuban Revolution in His tori cal Perspective." 
A. V. Huff, Jr. 
Secretary-Treasurer 
ii 
"The Unionist Party and the Third Home 
Rule Crisis, 1912-1914."1 
by 
W. S. Brockington, Jr. 
In July 1914, leading British politicians made a major attempt by formal 
meeting to settle the long standing and by then explosive question of Irish 
Home Rule. The famous Buckingham Conference ended in complete failure, how-
ever, for as the Prime Minister said, "The Conference being unable to agree, 
either in principle or in detail, ... brought its meetings to a conclusion. "2 
With these words to the House of Commons, Herbert Henry Asquith announced 
the failure of parliamentary democracy in Great Britain. Home Rule for 
Ireland was not to be settled by bargaining and compromise, the two great 
touchstones of a plural democracy. Negotiation, both secret and public, had 
failed. To many, the result of this final failure would be civil war in 
Great Britain before the end of the year. The situation could hardly have 
been interpreted otherwise as armed defiance to the will of Parliament had 
been guaranteed if Home Rule became law. And Home Rule would become law 
before the 1914 Session of Parliament came to an end. 
The third Government of Ireland Bill--introduced in the House of Commons 
on 11 April 1912, and twice rejected by the House of Lords--was to become law 
under the provisions of the Parliament Act of 1911.3 In Ulster the slogan 
"We won't have it" was supported by a grim Protestant majority that was de-
termined to resist the implementation of Home Rule in Ulster--by force if 
necessary. Supporting the claims and demands of the Protestant Ulstermen 
was the Unionist Party, which, under the direction of Andrew Bonar Law, had 
bound itself to a declared policy of tot'al and unqualified support for Ulster. 
In the three other traditional provinces of Ireland support for Home Rule by 
the overwhelming Roman Catholic majority was just as vociferous as was Ulster's 
opposition. With such support the Irish Nationalist Party, or Nationalists, 
was determined to have Home Rule for Ireland--all of Ireland. The Liberal 
Party, committed to Home Rule for a single Ireland both by ideology and by 
political necessity, was as bound to its ally, the Nationalists, as was the 
Unionist Party to its Ulster partner. Both major parties had strived for 
compromise but had been unable to effect a settlement of any kind. This 
impasse had arisen not only because of the limitations on concessions that the 
Irish ally of each was willing to accept but also because of a basic mistrust 
which had undermined the regard that each party held for the other. Under 
such circumstances bargaining and compromise could hardly take place. 
If Home Rule for Ireland had been the single issue at stake, the British 
political system probably could have withstood the challenge. But the Home 
1 
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Rule controversy brought to the fore the vast differences between the Liberal 
Party and the Unionist Party. Particularly after the first Home Rule Crisis 
of 1886, issues that either party considered fundamental had often led to 
struggles that left both parties embittered and distrustful. As each parlia-
mentary party attempted to convey the importance of these issues to an ever 
expanding electorate, fiery political rhetoric had further broadened the chasm 
between the two. Compounding this long-simmering antipathy was the plight of 
the Unionist Party in 1911. It had been six years in the political wilderness; 
it had lost three consecutive elections and held only two-fifths of the seats 
in the House of Commons; it had been humiliated by the disastrous struggle 
over the Parliament Bill. Tariff Reform had split the Party; the "Ditch-
Hedger" controversy had factionalized it further. The Liberals had been 
successful in countering virtually every move made by the Unionist Party and 
seemed invincible. They could stay in office until 1915, given Irish support, 
and there appeared to be little the Unionists could do to topple them. 
Finally, following A. J. Balfour's resignation of the party leadership in 
November 1911, the Unionists were without an experienced party leader. Bonar 
Law, a former Glaswegian iron-monger who was, outside Parliament, relatively 
unknown, had been a compromise choice as Balfour's replacement. 
The election of Bonar Law to the position of Leader of the Unionist Party 
in the House of Commons was quite significant. Balfour, the cool aristocrat, 
had run the Party on Nineteenth Century lines; Bonar Law, the ironmaster, was 
to run it on Twentieth Century lines. He was typical of many of the younger 
Tory politicians--tough, middle-class men who disdained the club image of 
former eras. These new men with new ideas had come to power because the needs 
of the Party demanded their specialties. The party organization was, in 1911, 
chaotic at best and was in dire need of good management. These new men were 
business managers who wanted to run the political machine as a business and 
not as a witty, urbane, exclusive men's club. Moreover, to these men, the 
Balfourian style of politics had been found wanting; new methods of attacking 
the opponents would have to be tried. Balfour's style had been that of dia-
lectician and debater, a style which impressed parliamentarians but left most 
voters cold; Bonar Law's style was quite the opposite--tough, terse and 
fighting. The rhetoric of politics soon reflected this "new style"4 of poli-
tician as politics quickly became increasingly partisan and vituperative. 
Party rank and file, disunited and in disarray, was willing to turn to these 
new faces and personalities in order to return to power. Thus, even though 
Bonar Law technically had to share leadership with the Marquess of Lansdowne, 
who led the Unionists in the House of Lords, it soon became evident that the 
new men and not aging aristocrats were going to dominate the Unionist Party 
and its actions. To these new men the unification of the Party was a matter 
of primary importance. Once this had been accomplished, the Party would stand 
an excellent chance of driving the Liberals from office. 
It had long been recognized in Great Britain that when the Parliament 
Bill of 1910 was passed, Home Rule would not be long in following. With its 
passage in 1911, the time had finally come when the Liberal Party would have 
to redeem its pledge of Home Rule for Ireland. As, for a variety of reasons, 
Home Rule was anathema to the many branches of Conservatism, an anti-Home 
Rule campaign was to be the vehicle by which party unity would be accomplished. 
To Tariff Reformers, the break-up of the United Kingdom would be but the first 
step in the dissolution and destruction of the British Empire. If Ireland 
were to gain freedom, other colonies would demand the same treatment. The 
Empire, instead of growing closer together, would become more separated; and 
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Britain would be weakened. Moreover, there were emotional ties between Ireland 
and England that defied rational explanation. The threatened severing of those 
ties was an impossible concept for many Unionists to grasp. The Home Rule 
issue was also to be the way by which the Liberals, or Radicals as Unionists 
preferred to call them, could be toppled from power. There was a genuine fear 
on the part of many Unionists that the policies of the Radical Government 
would, if pursued, inevitably destroy Great Britain. Bonar Law wrote, "My 
real belief is that in the troubles ahead of us connected with labour we are 
moving very fast in the direction of revolution •••• 11 5 To him and to most 
Unionists, only the Unionist Party could "get the train for a time at least 
shifted on to other lines." Yet, as the result of the Parliament Act, no 
effective opposition to Liberal policies could be offered at Westminster. 
Therefore, the Unionists would have to appeal to a higher authority; public 
opinion would have to be altered to the point where the Liberals would have 
to call a general election. 
Unfortunately, although Home Rule was potentially the best political 
issue for the Unionists, there was little interest by the electorate (except 
in Ireland) in an anti-Home Rule campaign. To stir the public from its apathy, 
the Unionists turned to a weapon which had been little used in the past--the 
Press. Under Bonar Law's leadership the Press was to become an important 
weapon, a tool for the persuasion of the voters. Once, Lord Salisbury had 
contemptuously dismissed the penny press as "written by office boys for 
office boys. 11 6 Bonar Law saw that the penny press reached millions more than 
the respectable but staid Conservative and Liberal newspapers. He grasped 
that the popular press offered lurid stories written in simple language for 
ill-educated readers. This style of reportage fit Bonar Law's rhetorical 
delivery perfectly. He made good copy; he was to use this attribute with 
great effect. With Bonar Law_ serving as their example, other Unionists 
likewise adopted the policy of giving forceful, slashing speeches against 
the Government in general and Home Rule in particular. The liberals were 
accused of trickery in politics, of having a spoils system created by the 
"Gaderine Swine", and of general incompetence, recklessness, and villainy.? 
Perhaps the most notorious statement was made by Bonar Law in a speech at 
Blenheim Palace on 27 July 1912. There he stated, 
I can imagine no length of resistance to which Ulster 
can go in which I should not be prepared to support 
them, and in which, in my belief, they would not be 
supported by the overwhelming majority of the British 
people.a 
Liberal leaders excoriated the "new style", terming it "a complete granunar 
of anarchy", 9 but these retorts had little effect on Unionists rhetoric.. It 
was accomplishing exactly that which it was supposed to. 
By November 1912, the Unionist Party was rejuvenated and united as it had 
not been in years. However, as the result of a temporary reopening of the 
Tariff Reform controversy, the Unionist Party was again wracked by internal 
dissension. With virtually no opposition, final passage of the Home Rule 
Bill through the House of Conunons was accomplished in January 1913. Although 
the Bill was promptly rejected by the House of Lords, there now remained only 
two more passages by the Commons for the Bill automatically to become law. 
The Unionist failure to delay or block Home Rule in Parliament meant that 
alternative methods of forcing the resignation of the Government would have to 
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be found. Publicly, the campaign of vitriolic speeches was continued. Pri-
vately, Unionist leaders attempted to persuade the King to intervene if the 
Goverment refused to submit the issue to the electorate, a technically justi-
fiable parliamentary maneuver albeit one that had fallen into disuse; the King, 
quite understandably, hesitated to do so. The Unionist public position was 
helped somewhat by the revelations of the Marconi Scandal, which apparently 
implicated certain Government Ministers in a financial scandal. But, regarding 
Home Rule, there was very little that the Unionists could actually do, and the 
second passage of the Home Rule Bill was accomplished in the summer of 1913. 
To Unionists, the Liberals were permitting Britain to drift towards chaos. 
Home Rule now needed but one more passage for it to become law. In Ulster 
and elsewhere, there were ominous warnings of civil war erupting if that were 
to happen. 
A brief glinnner of hope appeared in the fall of 1913 when, as the result 
of a mutual misunderstanding (each thought the other had initiated the sugges-
tion), the leaders of the major parties met secretly to discuss possible 
compromise. Asquith met first with Bonar Law and later with Edward Carson, the 
leader of the Ulster Unionists, in an effort to reach an understanding. Sadly, 
these talks failed. Both sides had die-hard wings that were adamantly opposed 
to compromise in any form; these could not be ignored. Neither side would or 
could offer what the other side could or would accept. Conference, a general 
election before or after the passage of the Home Rule Bill, Home Rule within 
Home Rule, veiled exclusion, naked exclusion--these solutions had been offered 
and rejected by one side or the other. The "unbridgeable chasm of principle"l0 
of which Asquith spoke was a reality. The hatreds and fears generated by over 
thirty-five years of bitter political rivalry made meaningful negotiation 
between the Liberals and the Unionists nearly impossible. Tragically, com-
pounding the problem of party bitterness was the antipathy that the Unionist 
and the Liberal leaders held each for the other. Their personalities clashed; 
their political styles were incompatible. Between them there could be no 
meaningful discussion of compromise. 
For the third and final campaign against the Home Rule Bill, the Unionist 
Party was far stronger than it had been two years earlier. Reorganization and 
reorientation had effected a unity that had been missing for almost ten years. 
Still, the only issue with which the Party could defeat the Government was the 
anti-Home Rule campaign, and Home Rule was not an issue that stirred the 
electorate. The Ulster noises were helping to generate public interest; but 
the public wanted a settlement of the Crisis, not a continual barrage of 
threats from Ulster. Yet, as the discussions between the party leaders had 
demonstrated, a political settlement of the Crisis was unlikely. Moreover, 
the entire thrust of the anti-Home Rule movement had changed. When the cam-
paign had begun, the Unionist Party leadership had controlled the tempo of 
actions throughout Great Britain. It was the leadership that had assigned 
topics of speeches, approved or rejected tactical maneuvers, and outlined 
party strategy. But as the campaign had dragged on, party leaders had grad-
ually lost control over the overall direction. Unionists were united over 
their opposition to H~e Rule, but they were disunited as to the method by 
which this opposition was to be demonstrated. Most, but not all, Unionists 
believed in the parliamentary system and hoped for a political settlement of 
the Crisis. Ulster Unionists, on the other hand, were determined that their 
demands were going to be met, with or without Unionist Party support. 
Shortly after the opening of the 1914 Session of Parliament, the Govern-
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ment offered to Ulster temporary exclusion from an all-Ireland Parliament. 
This was contemptuously rejected by Carson when he made clear, in virtually 
flawless Unionist logic, that "Ulster wants this question settled now and 
for ever. We do not want sentence of death with a stay of execution for six 
years. 11 11 This seemingly moderate Liberal offer put the Unionists on the 
defensive. Liberal speakers spoke vigorously in favor of Asquith's proposal 
and castigated the Unionist rejection of the offer. Winston Churchill, at 
Bradford, on March 14, challenged the Unionists. 
If every concession that is made is spurned and 
exploited •.• If all the loose, wanton and reckless 
chatter we have been forced to listen to these 
months is in the end to disclose a sinister 
revolutionary purpose, then I can only say to 
you "Let us go forward and put these grave 
matters to the proof. 1112 
The proof of which Churchill spoke was a show of force against Ulster which 
he and several others at the War Office were planning. The entire situation 
was drastically altered by an incident at the Curragh, a military camp outside 
Dublin. There, some cavalry officers, believing themselves to have been 
ordered north to attack Ulster, resigned; the "maneuvers" were hastily called 
off. The damage, however, had been done. To many Unionists, including 
Bonar Law, the Government, having proved itself corrupt by its "bargain"l3 
with the Nationalists and by the Narconi Scandal, had now demonstrated a will-
ingness to resort to extra-legal tactics. Liberal leaders had been guilty of 
a "pogrom plot" against Ulster; they would have to suffer the consequences. 
By this time militants on both sides were beginning to chafe at restric-
tions that the constitutional system imposed. In England, Lord Alfred Milner, 
the great Imperial Proconsul, was organizing a movement which would, as he 
termed it, "paJW.lyze the aJtm which might be raised to strike1114 Ulster. The 
movement of which he wrote would be one that would aid in the arming and 
supplying of the Ulster Volunteer Force (U.V.F.), a paramilitary organization 
of 100,000 Ulstermen dedicated to the opposition of Home Rule. In the South 
of Ireland the Nationalists were finding it ever more difficult to restrain 
the inflamed passions of the militant Sinn Fein movement. The National 
Volunteers had been formed in imitation of the U.V.F. and had 180,000 
Volunteers enrolled. Fortunately, none of these groups were armed with much 
more than broomsticks and a few sporting rifles. The gun-running at the Lame 
(April 24/25) changed this; Ulster was now armed. Ulster's threat of military 
resistance to Home Rule, if passed, could no longer be dismissed as an idle 
one. If Ulster were to be coerced, it would mean, at best, bloodshed, and, 
at worst, civil war. 
The situation was now this. On the one hand, the Government was 
virtually powerless to act. The Incident at the Curragh and the Larne gun-
running had left the Liberals with an Irish Home Rule Bill which was certain 
to become law but which would be almost impossible to impose on Ulster. On 
the other hand, the Unionists had been surprised by the Ulster actions but had 
supported them. Bonar Law, as were many other leaders, was all too aware of 
the significance of Ulster's actions; but there was apparently little that 
could be done to halt it. Now armed, Ulster seemed determine to go its way 
regardless of the strategy of the Unionist Party. In addition, Milner's 
extremist movement was gathering supporters who wanted to force the Government 
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into acting against Ulster, hoping that this would bring about an adverse 
public reaction against the Government. Another die-hard movement was forming 
in the Lords, which, as one organizer described it, could have developed into 
a "diehard movement worse that 1911. "15 Despite this fractionalization the 
Unionist Party leaders were determined to maintain their demands regarding the 
amending of the Home Rule Bill. The goal of the Party was still to be a 
parliamentary settlement of the Ulster question, but not at the expense of 
certain fundamental principles. The result of this impasse between the two 
major parties could have been nothing but tragic for Britain's parliamentary 
system. Bonar Law told Austen Chamberlain, "I do not think that people 
generally realize how profoundly the social structure has been shaken by 
recent events. 1116 Even with this awareness, however, Unionist leaders firmly 
believed that the Liberal Party was destroying the Constitution and that this 
deadly force had to be opposed. To them, if the Liberals were unwilling to 
consider "reasonable" alternatives, then whatever came to pass would be their 
responsibility. 
Private meetings between party leaders were again held; once more these 
were unsuccessful. The Buckingham Conference of July was virtually a last 
resort; it, too, failed. There was virtually no hope for compromise; Home 
Rule would have to be enacted; Ulster would have to resist the enforcement 
of Home Rule. The future was bleak; bloodshed was almost a certainty. Com-
promise became an even remoter possibility when the Irish Volunteers staged 
a gun-running of their own. Now, there were two, partially armed, private 
armies in Ireland. Only the outbreak of war in Europe ended what the warring 
groups in Great Britain could not. With the German threat to Britain's 
security there was created a unanimity of purpose that transcended the petti-
ness of party politics. 
The period covered by the Third Home Rule Crisis, 1912-1914, was one of 
great importance for the Unionist Party. In 1911 it had lacked unity, specific 
goals, and coordination of effort. Bonar Law's election to Unionist Leader in 
the House of Conunons meant the elevation of a party man to the highest position 
in the Party. Politics was no longer something to be played at or dabbled in; 
it had become serious business. Bonar Law treated it as such. In an effort 
to obtain more efficiency for the Party, he frequently utilized the talents of 
Unionists with business backgrounds. These businessmen gradually revamped the 
Party into a party of the middle class. The Party that Bonar Law had inherited 
was demoralized and factionalized. Within three years solidarity had been 
attained and a new sense of purpose had been instilled. The method by which 
this had been accomplished was the exploitation of the Irish Home Rule contro-
versy. Using the "new style" of public oratory, Law vigorously and incessantly 
assailed the Irish policy of the Liberal Government. This singleness of 
purpose rallied Unionists and instilled in them the hope that the Liberal-
Nationalist coalition could be defeated. Party morale soared as Bonar Law 
forced the Liberals onto the defensive. Only when it became apparent that the 
parliamentary method was not succeeding did Bonar Law experience any trouble 
in managing the Party. Yet even in the last stages of the anti-Home Rule 
campaign, when it was obvious that Home Rule would be enacted and that civil 
war might break out over Ulster, he was still in control of the Party although 
not of Ulster. Ironically, at the end of World War I, when the Irish situation 
was finally disposed of, it was dealt with by a Coalition Governaent that was 
essentially Unionist. The Unionist Party had survived the war intact whereas 
the Liberal and the Nationalist Parties had not. 
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Although Unionist tmity was attained and maintained, the constitutional 
system in Great Britain had suffered greatly. It is even possible that there 
might have been a civil war in Ireland had Home Rule been passed. How could 
such actions be justified? To many Unionists, the Liberal Government repre-
sented the force that was systematically wrecking the political, economic, 
religious, and social structures that were the foundations of Britain's great-
ness. If Britain were to be saved, this deadly force had to be opposed by 
whatever parliamentary tactic was most effective. As the Liberals had refused 
to abide by the standards of parliamentary responsibility--that is, had refused 
to pay heed to the rights of the minority--Unionists could hardly be expected 
to have done so either. Through this logic, the Unionist campaign of support 
for Ulster and of threats against the Govert1111ent could be justified. This 
extreme interpretation of the "enemy" was buttressed by the "corrupt bargain" 
between the Liberals and the Nationalists which destroyed the ideals of parlia-
mentary democracy, by the Marconi Scandal which branded the Government as 
corrupt liars, and by the Curragh Incident which indicated that the Liberals 
themselves were willing to destroy the constitutional system in order to 
achieve their goals. The Government was Radical, corrupt, and unconstitutional. 
Therefore, Bonar Law could, with an almost Cromwellian attitude, see his 
country poised on the brink of civil war and would not compromise his or his 
party's principles in order to stave off the disaster. It was as if the 
Unionists were willing to see Britain destroyed in order that Britain might be 
saved. 
1 This paper presents an overview of the most significant motives for 
Unionist actions during the Third Home Rule Crisis. For a complete discussion 
of the Crisis, see William S. Brockington, Jr., The Uniol'Ll6t Pa1r..ty and Iwh 
Home Rule: Andlt.ew B0na11. Law and the Iwh Home Rule Cw.u., 1912-1914, unpub-
lished dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1975. 
2 House of Commons, The P<Vr.U.amenJ:alr.y Ve.bate&: 066)..cJ..a.l Repou, Fifth 
Series (hereafter referred to as Common6Vebate&), Vol. 65, Col. 897, 24 July 
1914. 
3 According to the Parliament Act, bills passed three times by the House 
of Commons over a period of two calendar years in three successive parlia-
mentary sessions, would be sent directly to the King for his assent. 
4 Commol't.6 Vebate-6, Vol. 36, Col. 1525, 11 April 1912. Asquith to Bonar 
Law. 
5 Bonar Law Papers (BL) 33/4/34. Bonar Law to Salisbury, 3 May 1912. 
6 R.C.K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914, Vol. XIV of The Ox6o~d H.u.to~lj 06 
England, ed. by G. N. Clark (15 Vols.; Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 313. 
7 Bonar Law speech at the Albert Hall. The T.une.&, 27 January 1912. 
8 Bonar Law speech at Blenheim Palace. The T.une.&, 28 July 1912. 
9 Asquith speech at Ladybank. The T.une.&, 7 October 1912. 
10 Cabinet Papers. Asquith to George V, 17 September 1913. 
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11 Co1m1on6 VebCL:teA, Vol. 59, Col. 937, 9 March 1914. 
12 Churchill speech at Bradford. The MancheAtelt GUCVtd.i.an, 16 March 1914. 
13 The "bargain" which angered Unionists was the apparent deal between 
Nationalist and Liberal leaders. In return for Nationalist support for the 
Parliament Act, the Liberals introduced the Home Rule Bill. Unionists deemed 
this political deal "corrupt." 
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To Herald the Revolution: The Public Activities of 
G. V. Chicherin and Maksim Litvinov in Wartime Britain 
by 
William J. Lavery 
In the long years from the Decembrist Uprising of 1825 to the drama of 
1917, the Russian Revolution was an eagerly awaited and often predicted event. 
The fall of tsarism was sought in the West and Russian revolutionaries were 
listened to with great interest for many English liberals and radicals believed 
that the collapse of the Romanov dynasty might begin a new age of human freedom. 
Two men, Georgii Chicherin and Maksim Litvinov, were in a position to serve as 
heralds of the revolution in 1917, one acting as an harbinger and the other as 
a messenger to the British people. This paper, then, is concerned with their 
efforts to proclaim, first, the possibility of a revolution and second, to 
announce its existence. 
In the long struggle with their autocracy, Russian revolutionaries often 
sought assistance from British progressives. They were rewarded with political 
asylum, financial aid, fraternal assistance, and favorable publicity.! A large 
number of prominent dissidents came to live in the United Kingdom including 
Aleksandr Herzen, Peter Kropotkin, and, more temporarily, Vladimir Lenin. 
World War I altered the situation dramatically for the Russian exile. Britain 
and Russia were allied against the Central Powers and by 1916 the struggle was 
not going well. English support for those exiles who still worked for the over-
throw of tsarism proved to be a war casualty. The situation changed even more 
dramatically with the success of the March 1917 revolution. Now it seemed all 
Britons and Russians of good conscience could support the policies of the demo-
cratic Provisional Government. In November 1917 this regime was toppled by the 
Bolsheviks and it became apparent that Russia would quit the war. Ironically, 
it was at the point that the long-sought social revolution occurred that 
British support for the endeavor flagged. 
Throughout the course of the World War two Russian exiles, Georgii 
Vasil'evich Chicherin and Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov, worked to explain and 
defend the goals of the Russian revolution. Neither received the sympathy of 
a large number of Britons but encountered hostility from the government, the 
trade unions, and a majority of elements of the political Left. 
As the horrors of the war continued, an even larger number of European 
socialists came to oppose it. Lenin, the contentious leader of a small Russian 
socialist organization, appeared at the head of the anti-war movement beginning 
with the Zimmerwald Conference of September 1915.2 His position on the war had 
been stated unequivocably from the onset: the war was imperialistic and all 
9 
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imprisoned for his anti-war work, Chicherin was appointed the Soviet ambassador 
to Britain in late November. This was a most transparent ploy to free 
Chicherin for the Soviets carefully mentioned the possibility of reprisals 
against English diplomatic personnel in Russia. According to Trotskii, 
Chicherin had been interned for anti-war agitation and it was entirely appro-
priate for the Bolsheviks to arrest the English ambassador for pro-war senti-
ments. The manuever succeeded, although at considerable cost in Soviet 
"popularity" in London, and Chicherin was exchanged for Sir George Buchanan 
on January 2, 1918. His efforts to herald the revolution had prevented him 
from being permitted to represent it in England. 
The task of proclaiming and explaining the Bolshevik experiment fell to a 
very different sort of Bolshevik than Chicherin. Maksim Litvinov had been a 
staunch supporter of Lenin since 1902. He had assisted in the organization 
and delivery of every Leninist newspaper from Ihlvr.a. to P~ole,taJr,i,i.. In 1906 
he attempted to purchase and smuggle massive quantities of weapons into Russia. 
His career as an active Bolshevik had come to an end in January 1908 with his 
arrest in Paris in connection with the notorious June 1907 Tiflis bank expro-
priation. Banished to England, Litvinov was required to remain politically 
inactive. He cultivated no contacts with the British Left and was completely 
unknown to native war protesters. 
He differed from Chicherin in social origin and intellectual tastes. Born 
into a lower-middle class Jewish merchant family living in the Pale, Litvinov 
did not attend a university; he was converted to socialism within the Russian 
army. He did not like nor did he trust socialist intellectuals. After 
observing the February 1915 London Conference of Inter-Allied Socialists, 
Litvinov informed Lenin that the Independent Labour Party was an insecure ally 
for the Bolsheviks in their campaign to create a new international. It was 
pacifistic on the question of the war and showed no interest in converting the 
international struggle into a series of class-oriented civil wars. He con-
sidered the British Socialist Party a weak partner, too, torn as it was by a 
"defeatist-defencist" schism,16 In fact, after seven years in Britain Litvinov 
could not endorse a single group, newspaper, or individual as sufficiently 
militant for the Bolsheviks.17 These feelings were reciprocated as a passage 
from the diary of Beatrice Webb makes clear: 
Litvinov lunched with us on Wednesday; he had written 
asking whether he could call. He is an anglicized 
Russian Jew of unprepossessing appearance - but with 
a certain honest sturdiness ••• He is not a bad sort~ 
a crude Marxist in his views •••• He believes in Govern-
ment by the "Proletariat" and does not believe the 
English race capable of it.18 
A more subtle indication of Litvinov's anonymity appeared in a January 
1918 issue of the British Socialist Party newspaper The Cali.. Most of the 
article dealt with the current activities of Chicherin, "our good comrade and 
member", within the Soviet foreign office. Litvinov, then the Russian Peoples' 
Ambassador, was merely described as having "worked closely in contact with 
us. 1119 This unfamiliarity would cost him dearly in his 1918 mission as the 
representative of a new Soviet regime. 
On January 3, 1918, Litvinov received his appointment as Russian Peoples' 
Ambassador in Great Britain in a most unorthodox and indirect manner: he read 
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about it in his morning newspaper. Apart from an order to secure pos s e s sion 
of all Russian governmental premises, funds, and files, the newes t Soviet 
diplomat was given no specific instructions. For much of the crucial time s 
between his appointment and the signing of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk on 
March 3, 1918, Litvinov would be forced to improvise a foreign policy.20 
In the course of his mission, Litvinov tried to explain Soviet foreign 
and internal policies to the British government, the left-of-center English 
press, and the trade union movement. The difficulties of acting as an 
ambassador and an as information bureau were not completely apparent to him 
in January 1918. For nine months he negotiated with the Foreign Office, 
quarreled with the diplomatic remnants of the Provisional Government, and 
attempted to represent the interests of Russians in Great Br i tain. Indeed, 
the archives of the Foreign Office demonstrate that the bulk nf his time was 
concerned with representing the position of his government to the British 
authorities. But, certainly the most visible and controversial of his actions 
was his press campaign. 
From the very beginning Litvinov believed that his mission had a dual 
character, defending Russian state interests but also serving as a source of 
information on the Soviet experiment for the British public. His attempts to 
reach local workers and leftist organizations soon angered the Foreign Office, 
Intending to create a favorable popular image of the new regime, Litvinov 
perceived his statements to be non-ideological and non-revolutionary. The 
British Cabinet and Foreign Office did not accept Litvinov's point of view. 
Their primary concern was to win the war against the Central Powers and any-
thing that hampered efforts to win the conflict would be viewed as seditious. 
Thus, Litvinov's explanations of Soviet efforts to leave the war came to be 
labelled "revolutionary", 21 
Although a number of liberal and left-wing newspaper s i ni tially expressed 
an interest in Litvinov's cause, Litvinov was not able t o f ul ly utilize these 
opportunities partly because of the censorship provision& o f the Defense of 
the Realm Act (D.O.R.A.), and partly because he had not participatec in Eng-
lish radical life. In short, Litvinov's press campaign was t oo diminutive t o 
sway English opinion but large enough to alarm the British gover1w1~nt. 
Litvinov faced a formidable task in altering the prevailing public image 
of the Bolshevik government. Many Englishmen believed the Bolsheviks to be 
paid German agents, while the late Provisional Government was viewed as a 
viable and democratic regime protecting English political and financial 
interests. The Bolsheviks, in contrast, were believed r 0 ady to seize all 
British holdings in Russia. On January 5, he granted his first interview to 
an English paper, The VCLLly NeJAJ.6 and LeadeJt. Here at the beginning of his 
mission he made a determined effort to disarm English opposition to the 
initial peace talks between the Soviets and the Central Powers without adopt-
ing a stance that could be interpreted as in favor of continuing the war. At 
this time Litvinov noted: 
Whatever the outcome may be, we (the Bolshevik government) shall 
not be the losers. Either we shall obtain a just democratic 
peace, or the shamelessness and arrogance of the rulers of the 
Central Powers will be exposed to the naked eyes of their peopl~~. 
We hope that the peoples of the Central Powers will soon strikt: ~nd 
strike hard against the attitude of their rulers.22 
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The next week saw him placing a more significant statement in British 
papers. He succeeded in publishing Trotsky's "theses" on the war. The 
always quotable Bolshevik Commissar of Foreign Affairs had written that the 
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war was not fought to free Belgium, Serbia, and France since the Central Powers 
had stated that they would evacuate these areas after a peace was signed. 
Trotsky challenged the Allied governments to apply the doctrine of national 
self-determination urged on the Central Powers to Ireland, Egypt, India, Mada-
gascar and Indochine. Should the Allied governments reject their subjects 
demand for peace, the West European working classes then had "the iron 
necessity of grasping the authority from the hands of those who cannot, or will 
not give peace to the peoples. 11 23 Trotsky may have raised valid points in his 
theses but it was impolitic of Litvinov to submit them to the English papers 
for publication. 
Several papers also published Litvinov's article "To the Workers of Great 
Britain" which stated the purpose of his English mission. He wrote that his 
government had ordered him to communicate the desires and hopes of Russian 
revolutionary democracy to the British, while gathering information on the 
English democratic movement. His first duty, however, was to furnish the 
"truth" about the Russian revolution and to expose the Russian middle-class's 
"secret" desire for an annexationist victory while telling the Russian people 
that they were seeking peace. Litvinov emphasized the basic social reforms 
instituted by the Soviets despite the chaos caused by the war. These included 
homes for the homeless, lands for the peasants, the eight hour work day, and 
the exposure of the secret treaties.24 Litvinov noted with alarm that inter-
national capitalism, not just the Russian conservatives, had retaliated against 
the new regime. If the war continued, he predicted, the Russian revolution was 
doomed and militarism would triumph everywhere in Europe. Therefore, the 
Russian workers in fighting for their revolution were fighting English labor's 
battles, too. While Litvinov clearly had not asked the British proletariat to 
revolt, his advice for them to join the Russian workers' peace efforts would 
have disrupted British governmental policies.25 
In an interview given to the Manehe-6teJt Gu..o.Jtdi..an, Litvinov explained to 
that paper's wider and more ideologically diverse readership that widespread 
suspicion existed in Russia that the Allies were prepared to sacrifice that 
country to the Germans in exchange for an end to the war in the West. Pointing 
out that Prime Minister David Lloyd George had not disavowed annexation as a 
war aim, Litvinov emphsized that his government was not interested in a sepa-
rate peace but hoped that ~he Allied governments would participate in a general 
conference to end the war. 6 
Litvinov had badly overstepped his prerogatives in this press campaign 
and the elements of the English government who opposed his presence in London 
were swift to react. On January 12 Sir George Cave, the Home Secretary and 
thus the highest police official in Britain, circulated a secret report on 
Bolshevik propaganda for Cabinet discussion. Cave thought that The He1tald was 
liable to prosecution under the provisions of the D.O.R.A. for publishing 
Litvinov's and Trotsky's materials. However, since other leftist papers as 
well as the conservative V<Ui.y NeJAJ~ and We-6b1u.~teJt Gazette also published or 
alluded to the offensive materials, prosecution appeared unwise. Cave finished 
his report with a recommendation that Litvinov be threatened with expulsion if 
the offending articles continued, that Litvinov's mail be monitored by the 
postal authorities, that the newspapers be threatened with future action, and 
that the Cabinet seriously consider a campaign to disseminate counter-
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propaganda within England.27 
In early February, Litvinov made the most serious error in his press 
campaign. To this point he had concentrated his efforts to place material in 
the readily identifiable leftist press. But now he sent a declaration from 
the "International Bureau of the Central Executive Connnittee of the Soviet 
Government" entitled "To the Workers of Britain, France, and Italy" to The 
Woo£wieh PioneeJt and LaboWt JoWtna.l. Woolwich is a working class area lying 
along the Thames in the southeastern part of London and is the site of the huge 
royal munitions factory. The local newspaper was moderate in hue, devoted to 
reporting the births, deaths, and accidents of the connnunity. The one excep-
tional feature was the energetic radical editorialist, "Freelance", who, on 
February 8, opened his column to Litvinov. The appearance of Litvinov's now-
familiar articles in a town dominated by the Woolwich Arsenal provoked a sharp 
reaction. 
"Freelance" published Litvinov' s brief request for space along with a 
declaration from the All-Russian Soviet. While Litvinov had not written any-
thing that can be construed as a direct call to revolution, the declaration 
asserted that "without a social revolution there can be no peace. 11 28 The 
Kerenskii government had fallen because it had linked the interests of the 
Russian middle class to those of the Entente capitalists. The Russian pro-
letariat had taken the first steps and now they expected the European workers 
to begin the revolution by struggling for peace and self-determination for all 
colonies. 
The War Cabinet took notice of the article in its next session. An un-
identified member referred to it as "inciting the munitions workers .•. to 
revolution. 11 29 Balfour replied that Litvinov was going to be warned and the 
British charge in Petrograd was instructed to inform the Bolsheviks that 
Litvinov's propaganda activities were intolerable.30 Litvinov received his 
warning from the Foreign Office on February 12; he was told that the English 
had no desire to sever relations, but that they would not tolerate his propa-
ganda because of the war. 
The Woo£wieh PioneeJt article clearly revealed the different interpreta-
tions given the words "revolution" and "propaganda" by Litvinov and the Foreign 
Office. The Bolshevik diplomat and his British liaison had unusually sharp 
exchanges. Litvinov brushed aside the warning given him and said that "I have 
to explain to the British people and to the working class ... the point of view 
of the Russian working class with regard to the present war and international 
situation. 11 31 He asserted that the attacks upon his government by the English 
"reactionary press" made his activities vital. Litvinov conceded that the 
statements of the Soviet government when contrasted with Allied war policies 
became indictments of the British authorities, but he strongly rejected any 
interpretation that criticism of Allied policy equalled an incitement to 
revolution. He told the Foreign Office that he often declined invitations to 
meetings in areas where labor problems were known to be acute. In this acri-
monious session, Litvinov's parting comments did nothing to soothe the British 
government: 
Since I am not recognized in full measure as the diplomatic 
representative of my country, I naturally feel that I enjoy 
more freedom in the way of publicity than I would otherwise. 
At the same time I must mention to you that I have absolutely 
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irrefutable proof of propaganda carried on both here 
and in Russia by the British authorities, and more 
importantly by the Foreign Office against the Bolshevik 
Government. 32 
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Litvinov did have access to working class leadership by way of the large 
public meeting. In late Janu~ry 1918 Litvinov was invited to address the 
annual Labour Party Conference in Nottingham. The important meeting always 
attracted an impressive list of guest speakers, and Litvinov was to share the 
rostr\.Un with Jean Longuet of the French Socialist Party and Camille Huysmans 
of the Belgi\.Un Labor Party. In his presentation, Litvinov noted that he repre-
sented no ordinary government, but the first government of the working classes. 
He told the Labourites not to believe that power had been usurped by a band of 
conspirators, for the people had accomplished this revolution. The revolt was 
not directed against the conduct of the war, but against the war itself. On 
the subject of Brest-Litovsk, Litvinov stated that the negotiations placed the 
German people on the s~ot; they now could end the war or continue it purely 
for territorial gain.3 Given a warm reception by the delegates, the moderate 
speech was interpreted in wartime England as a grave risk to British security. 
The London Vwy Ex.p!r..eM, called it "the most menacing speech ever delivered by 
the Ambassador of a friendly country. 11 34 
Now the Home Office began to curtail Litvinov's public activities to limit 
his influence. Even before the Nottingham conference Scotland Yard had raided 
the offices of the British Socialist Party, confiscating a pamphlet entitled 
"Russia's Appeal: Will British Labour Remain Silent?", which Litvinov planned 
to distribute at the conference.35 
The last of Litvinov's public appearances occurred at the end of February 
amid r\.Unors of au impendi~g treaty between the Bolsheviks and the Central 
Powers. He addressed a r.iec tir,~ r,f the British :,ocialist Party in London. 
Despite his earlier and priv3te deprecation of the B.S.P., Litvinov described 
the Bolsheviks and them as closely linked in ideas and personnel.* Again 
taking up the volatile subject of Soviet-German negotiations, Litvinov claimed 
that the Bolsheviks had achieved the aims of the 1915 Zimmerwala conference to 
end the war. Arguing that "the Russian Revolution had done its duty to the 
International and that the Inte,:national must now do its duty to the Russian 
Revolution", he blamed the "opportunistic" Socialist Party of Germany for 
thwarting the peace movement in that country.36 He was saddened, he said, to 
see that the S.P.D. was not the only European socialist party making common 
cause with their bourgeois governments against the Bolsheviks. It has become 
increasingly clear to all "true democrats", he concluded, that militarism would 
be eliminated only when capitalism was finished. 
At this point British governmental and press opposition to Litvinov 
triumphed. On February 28, Lord Robert, the Minister of Blockade, stated that 
Litvinov by publishing anti-war materials had intervened in internal British 
affairs and that the government would not protect him from press attacks, as 
Ramsay MacDonald wished.37 On March 1, Sir George Cave issued the stiffest 
warning to Litvinov. Describing the Bolshevik as the unrecognized ambassador 
*Litvinov was accurate here since Chicherin, Peter Petrov, Joseph Fine-
berg, and Theodore Rothstein were all members of the B.S.P. and the Bolsheviks. 
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of an unrecognized regime primarily engaged in propaganda ventures, Cave 
revealed that the government was issuing an Order in Council forbidding any 
alien from addressing public meetings or distributing material not specifically 
approved by the Home Secretary.38 Litvinov was forced to heed this warning, 
and it terminated any effective action he could conduct in England. His 
position had become so tenuous that he did not feel secure enough to attend 
the annual B.S.P. conference, although that organization had staunchly 
supported him since his appointment. On March 31, he merely sent his greet-
ings to the congress.39 He had ceased to function as the spokesman of the 
Russian revolution in England. 
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Some observations 
1) There is more similarity between Litvinov's 1918 diplomatic mission and 
Chicherin's 1914-1917 efforts than between the 1918 mission and subsequent 
early Soviet diplomatic campaigns. 
2) In contrast with Walter Kendall who speaks of a consistent Soviet policy 
there was not Soviet effort--during the tenure of Chicherin or Litvinov 
as "ambassadors"--to subvert or covertly manipulate English affairs. 
3) However, the question of a Russian withdrawal from the war was interpreted 
by the British Government as subversive in itself, 
4) The Litvinov mission had not been forced on the British Government. They 
wanted to place an agent of their own within Russia and Litvinov was the 
necessary quid pltO quo. An examination of the evidence reveals that 
Litvinov was not supported by his government in his quest for parity with 
the Lockhart mission, 
S) It became clear that the English left-wing would support Russian revolution-
ary efforts to obtain human rights, but would not endorse the cause of 
social revolution and class-warfare. 
WILLIAM W. BOYCE: 
A LEADER OF THE SOUTHERN PEACE IDVEMENT 
by 
Roger P. Leem uis 
William Waters Boyce (1818-1890) was a prominent South Carolina De100crat, 
known mainly for his efforts, as a Confederate Congressman, to promote a 
negotiated peace. Born in Charleston, he attended South Carolina College and 
the University of Virginia, opened a law practice in Winnsboro, ~airfield 
District, in 1841, was a farmer, and served for one term (1846-1847) in the 
state legislature. On the eve of the Civil War he owned twenty-seven slaves 
and an estate valued at over fifty-eight thousand dollars.! 
He is historically interesting, because he was typical of South Carolina 
politicians during the 1850's, and because he became controversial during the 
Civil War. Boyce was a wealthy planter and man of stature, a conservative who 
wanted to maintain unity and stability in a slaveholding society. 
In response to the Compromise of 1850, South Carolina was favorable to 
disunion. Opinion divided mainly between cooperationists and proponents of 
separate state secession. (The small minority of \lllionists sided with the 
cooperationists.) Boyce was a cooperationist who desired a Southern confed-
eracy, although he did not regard the Compromise as particularly offensive. 
He did believe that there existed signs of Northern antagonism which warranted 
the South's departure from the Union.2 
Campaigning against separate action, he warned that a lone withdrawal 
would bring isolation and economic ruin. His arguments revealed anxiety about 
the racial equilibrium. In his words, separate secession would accelerate 
white emigration to the West. The slaves would be cut off from the Western 
market, and the racial balance would be upset.3 
The drive against separate secession succeeded, and when Boyce won his 
first election to the United States Congress in 1853, the disunionist agitation 
had subsided. His constituency, which had a slave majority, embraced the 
election districts of York, Chester, Fairfield, Kershaw, Richland, and Sumter, 
in the central part of the state. Regularly re-elected without opposition, he 
served in Washington until December 1860,4 
During the antebellum years his position on most issues reflected a large 
segment of public opinion in the state. The Winnsboro legislator supported 
the Kansas Nebraska Act of 1854, and for two years after its passage he urged 
21 
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a vigorous Southern offensive in Kansas. Boyce evidently did not think that 
the South's posture towards Kansas was beligerent and provocative. In 1855 he 
declared that his section was asserting its "rights in the Union." He also 
hoped that conservative Northerners would support the South's claim to 
"equality" in the territories.5 
Except for his call for a forceful Southern stand in Kansas, he was, 
during his years in Washington, temperate on sectional questions. Deprecating 
extremism, he speculated in 1854 that disunion would bring long and bloody 
wars. Like ioost South Carolina politicians, he was a conditioned unionist, 
and like the late John C. Calhoun, he was a "marx of the master class." In 
an 1854 speech Boyce warned that the abolitionists' pursuit of the higher law 
and natural rights ideas would provoke a race war. Blacks would perish, 
Southern whites would suffer, and the convulsions would spread to the North. 
Should the higher law theory become popular aioong Northern laborers, all 
property interests would be imperiled. "It is surprising that the property-
holders of the North do not see the dangerous consequences involved in the 
higher-law principle of the slavery agitation. 116 
He wanted conservatives to rule everywhere and protect slavery. In an 
1855 speech he interpreted the slavery question as chiefly a social issue, 
affecting poor and rich alike. "It involves the question; shall we remain 
as we are, the advanced guard of civilization, enjoying the greatest aioount of 
its blessings, and the least of its evils, or shall we run the hazards of 
another St. Domingo?"? The Congressman argued that the prosperity of the 
civilized world was tied to slavery. Moreover, he occasionally taunted the 
North for its apparent social fragility, commenting that workers' strikes and 
disturbances occurred only under a free labor system. 8 
In his desire for social concord, Boyce wanted the country's population to 
remain stationary. Wishing to avoid any increase in the black population, he 
attacked the ioovement to legalize the foreign slave trade. He spoke against 
homestead legislation, stating that it would invite increased immigration, 
"too soon to bring upon us all the evils of a vast population. 119 
The same outlook led him to resist the Democratic party's expansionist 
foreign policy. He believed that the acquisition of new lands would place an 
intolerable strain upon the country. When Cuban annexation was debated, the 
Winnsboro representative declared that "we do not need any more space." He 
also used the racist argument that the Cuban blacks, whites, and mulattoes 
were unfit for assimilation into the American society.10 
Boyce complained that the South was subsidizing the North's prosperity 
through the protective tariff, and he adhered strongly to laissez-faire 
economics. Yet he regarded the defense of slavery as the South's main concern, 
and he wanted his section to be united as it faced the antislavery threat.11 
In South Carolina, a one-party Deioocratic state, he did not affiliate 
with either of the two major factions--the National Deioocrats or the Southern 
Rights Democrats. The former, led by Congressman James L. Orr of Anderson, 
favored close ties with the national party as the most effective means to 
insure continued union under Deioocratic party rule. The latter, led by 
Robert Barnwell Rhett, Maxcy Gregg, and Congressmen Lawrence Keitt and John 
McQueen, regarded disunion as inevitable and would put no faith in national 
parties. Holding the balance between these two wings were many uncommitted 
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Democrats, who were generally conditional unionists. Among them were Boyce, 
James H. Hammond, and James Chesnut, Jr.12 
The Winnsboro legislator contended that more intimate bonds with the 
national organization would restrict the state's freedom of action. Besides, 
he maintained, South Carolina was not obligated to the national party. Many 
Northern Democrats, he noted, had failed to stand by the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
after voting for it. Except in those Northwestern states where Stephen A. 
Douglas' influence was great, the Northern Democrats "dodged" the issue. The 
Congressman apparently had friendly relations with Douglas. When the Illinois 
senator formed a syndicate for a real estate venture in northern Wisconsin in 
the early 1850's, Boyce was one of the purchasers of shares,13 
He opposed the National Democrats' campaign to secure South Carolina's 
presence at the 1856 Democratic national convention in Cincinnati. His posi-
tion did not prevail and the state send delegations to the 1856 and 1860 
national gatherings.14 Although Boyce shared the Southern Rights faction's 
conviction that the Northern Democrats were undependable friends of the South, 
he did, as a conditional unionist, wish to see the Democrats retain power in 
Washington. He suggested that a state convention endorse President Franklin 
Pierce for a second term in 1856, contending that such action would preserve 
"our political individuality. 1115 
Desire for social stability influenced his opposition to the National 
Democrats in South Carolina. He frankly feared a levelling democracy, which 
would supposedly be stimulated by a rivalry between national parties in the 
state. 16 
Further, if we wish to cherish the conservatism of the State, 
preserve existing forms and checks and compromises, we should 
above all things avoid fusion with a great national party, 
because in the fierce struggle for power between the different 
national parties--for as I have said, we will have more than 
one--it will soon become necessary to appeal to the fierce 
democratic spirit, and seek to govern from below, upwards. 
By the middle 1850's the Congressman became decidely pessimistic about 
the future of the Union. The country's growth had been so great, he remarked, 
that a weakening of the Union's cohesive force was unavoidable. Heightening 
his gloom was a fear that the Republican party, which he viewed as anti-
Southern, would eventually gain power. He wanted the South to curb the Repub-
lican appeal by convincing the North that the slave states were peaceful and 
nonaggressive. However, should the North turn to the Republicans even while 
the South was moderate, then the Southern people "will be satisfied that they 
have nothing further to hope from the North." The sensitive issues that Boyce 
wanted his section to avoid were demands for a legalized foreign slave trade 
and a slave code for the territories. He was satisfied to leave the slaver1 
question "where the Constitution and the Dred Scott decision now place it." 7 
As the 1860 election approached he became uneasy. Early in the year he 
wrote of a general drift towards disunion, yet he doubted that "the Southern 
mind" was prepared for drastic measures. Before Christopher G. Memminger 
travelled to Virginia in January, with instructions from the South Carolina 
legislature to promote a cooperationist program, Boyce cautioned him not to 
be overbearing. He advised Memminger to give the impression that South 
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Carolina would follow Virginia's lead, by remaining in or leaving the Union.18 
While anticipating secession, be clung to his hope that the Union would 
be preserved. Pleading that the South "give no pretext" for the election of a 
Republican, he also warned that the Republicans, by expounding their "theory 
of irrepressible conflict" between the free and slave labor systems, were 
driving the South to desp~ration. Insisting that ~epublican victory in 1860 
would justify immediate secession, Boyce was confident that the slave section 
would react affirmatively to South Carolina's initiative. A cooperationist in 
the past, he joined such disunionists as Keitt, McQueen, and Governor William 
Gist in demanding separate state secession. After Lincoln's election he called 
for immediate and decisive steps.19 
In his social and political conservatism, in his militant defense of 
slavery and uncompromising racism, in his opposition to expansion and to 
protective tariffs, in his stance on the Democratic party, in his conditional 
unionism, in his resolve that the South should not tolerate Republican rule, 
Boyce was a typical and highly articulate South Carolina politician of the 
1850's20 
In 1860 the Winnsboro representative had been a reluctant secessionist, 
wishing to avoid disunion but regarding it as the necessary response to 
Lincoln's election. Cautious and conservative, he had been hesitant in the 
prewar years to pursue radical measures which might disturb the social peace. 
He regretted the circumstances that led to the Civil War. Yet when war came 
he wanted to wage it effectively. If the South could not secure its indepen-
dence on the battlefield, he finally reasoned, it should use diplomatic means 
to achieve the same goal. Boyce had the mind of a guerrilla fighter. 
He sat in the Provisional, First, and Second Congresses of the Confederacy. 
Frequently critical of Jefferson Davis, he did support some major administra-
tion measures, among them revenue legislation and the 1865 decision to arm the 
slaves. He usually opposed suspension of habe<Ui COltpu.6, and he voted against 
the early conscription laws, preferring instead a system of state quotas, but 
he voted for the 1864 draft law.21 
In early 1862 he spoke out for more aggressive Southern fighting, while 
privately he lamented that Confederate failure to advance boldly had jeopardiz-
ed chances of winning the border states; for this failure he blamed Davis. As 
the war progressed the Carolinian came to doubt the wisdom of continued fight-
ing. In the spring of 1862 he privately expressed misgivings about Confederate 
military prospects.22 
He favored diplomatic initiatives that might distract the enemy, and he 
voted for various proposals for negotiations, with Southern independence as a 
condition. In early 1863 he joined fellow South Carolinian William Porcher 
Miles and others in suggesting an alliance with the Northwestern states of the 
Union. On February 6, 1863, Boyce introduced a resolution asking Davis to 
send a secret agent to Canada to promote such a connection.23 
He was prominent in the Congressional peace party. Among the others vere 
Tennessee Representative Henry S. Foote and Senators John Watson of Mississippi, 
William A. Graham of North Carolina, James L. Orr of South Carolina, and 
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Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia. Many Southerners viewed the Winnsboro legis-
lator as the head of the peace 100vement. However, the Congressional peace 
party had no recognized single leader and was casually organized.24 
By the late summer of 1864 Boyce concluded that prolonged hostilities 
would ruin the South. In his words, Davis' "intermeddling with the armies is 
usually disastrous, and he has no diplomacy." The Union president he con-
sidered an imrelenting foe, and he believed that Lincoln's defeat in the 
Noveni:,er 1864 election would offer the South's only hope. The Carolinian 
reckoned that the South could imdercut Lincoln by proposing an armistice and 
a congress of all Northern and Southern states. If Lincoln accepted the offer, 
"we might have peace as the fruit. If he declined it absolutely, or accepted 
it with impossible conditions, a reaction might set in against him strong 
enough to sweep him overboard in the Presidential election. 1125 
Boyce doubted that Davis would make such an overture unless public opinion 
forced him. In October 1864 the Congressman publicized his scheme in an open 
letter to Davis. He urged the Confederate president to aid the Northern De!IK)-
crats by proposing an armistice and a convention of all states. The letter 
pictured a military despotism emerging in the South, and it warned that "a 
peace without reconciliation" would fasten upon both sides permanent war 
machines • 26 
The idea of a convention of Union and Confederate states was not new. It 
had been discussed throughout the war, and several politicians, a100ng them 
Vice-President Alexander Stephens and Governor Joseph E. Brown, both of Georgia, 
were sympathetic. It was Boyce who openly approached Davis with the convention 
concept. The result of his boldness was a more earnest public consideration of 
the question. 27 
His action was courageous, and he became controversial. The letter writer 
encoimtered a largely negative response; his suggestion actually provoked 
declarations of support for Davis. In South Carolina the controlling political 
group, which represented the planter aristocracy, feared that the plan might 
pro100te reconstruction of the old Union. On October 17, a mass meeting in 
Colulli:,ia approved a resolution demanding the Congressman's resignation. Facing 
the i.mfriendly crowd, Boyce maintained that his plan was "best calculated to 
defeat the North, by building up a peace party in that section." Writing the 
open letter to davis subjected him to personal risk. "I am told there is a man 
in this crowd who has said he would kill me tonight."28 
The plan's sponsor denied charges that he was encouraging defeatism and 
reunion. Shortly after the Colulli:,ia meeting he stated that Southern delegates 
to his proposed convention should be counnitted against reconstruction. In 
Winnsboro on Noveni:,er 7, he visualized the opportimities open to the Confed-
eracy should the Northern Democrats win the election. While Lincoln's succes-
sor sought an armistice, as the De100cratic platform obliged him, the South 
could reopen its closed ports; sympathetic foreign nations would be able to 
intervene. Noting the numerical superiority of the Union1 Boyce wanted to 
divide the enemy by strengthening the Northern De!IK)crats.L9 
The allusion to the North's numerical edge aroused anger. Several days 
later the Representative stated, "I by no means desired or intended to express 
the opinion that we could no longer continue the contest." By citing the 
enemy's numerical advantage, he replied, he was trying to foster a policy that 
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would disintegrate the enemy. However, in the previous month he had privately 
written, "If the war goes on we are ruined. We lose both slavery and freedom."30 
In spite of the denunciations that he faced in ColUI!Dia, there were signs 
of support for Boyce. One gathering passed a resolution rejecting reconstruc-
tion but urging the full use of diplomacy to end the conflict. 31 
On Noveni>er 21, the Winnsboro legislator voted for a House resolution, 
unanimously passed, that the Confederacy would accept no peace short of inde-
pendence. On Deceni>er 2, he backed a call for a Southern convention or, as an 
alternative, a council of state commissioners who would advise the Richmond 
government on matters of war and peace. This proposal, presented by Foote, 
was overwhelmingly defeated.32 
Davis outmaneuvered the peace party by agreeing to the Hampton Roads 
conference of early February 1865. As he expected, this meeting of Union and 
Confederate leaders was abortive, and Davis gained support for his view that 
peace talks offered no hope. Boyce the peace advocate was now silenced. When 
the Confederacy collapsed he advised his constituents to acquiesce in the war's 
outcome.33 
The former Congressman, like most Southern politicians, became anxious to 
see civil governments restored in his section. In June 1865 he spoke out for a 
conciliatory attitude towards the conqueror, acceptance of the end of slavery, 
and kind treatment of the blacks. Before President Andrew Johnson appointed 
Benjamin F. Perry provisional governor in June, Boyce was prominently mentioned 
for the position, and he received a presidential pardon.34 
There were elements of opportunism and wisdom in his positions on postwar 
issues. His opinion of the democratic reform movement, which he had opposed 
in the past, changed drastically. Johnson, a longtime antagonist of the 
Southern aristocracy, now sat in the White House, and Boyce was courting the 
president's favor. In letters to Johnson he proposed the creation of "a 
people's State." Before Perry's appointment was announced, Boyce urged the 
president to rely upon James L. Orr and himself to establish a loyal government 
and guide the reform process. "He and I acting together could answer for this 
State, and be of more service to you than any number of other people could be." 
The Winnsboro politician was disappointed by his failure to obtain a leadership 
role. In the fall he ran unsuccessfully for the United States Senate.35 
Skeptical about the future of Southern race relations, Boyce called for 
friendship be tween Southern and Northern whites. The blacks he considered in-
dolent and improvident, unlikely to succeed as free laborers. In his mind, 
the region's prosperity required black colonization and white immigration. 
"Receive immigrants from Europe and the United States with open arms." In late 
1865 he predicted a reduction in the plantation work forces, with much black 
unemployment resulting. He wanted the United States to establish agencies at 
every Southern court house to ascertain what blacks were idle. He proposed 
that federal officials then relocate them on plantations "in the extreme 
South." 36 · 
On issues of civil and political rights for blacks, Boyce was more liberal 
than most white South Carolinians in 1865. He wanted the freedom to enjoy 
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"perfect equality and justice before the law," but he opposed a universal black 
suffrage as a condition for Southern representation in Congress. Privately he 
favored for both races a qualified suffrage, with the vote granted to all 
literate persons who owned real estate valued at one hundred and fifty dollars. 
Because many blacks and whites could not have met this requirement, the pro-
posal was conservative, not a likely suggestion from an advocate of democratic 
reform. There was an incongruity between Boyce's suffrage position and his 
desire that South Carolina become "a people's State. 11 37 
His wealth destroyed by war, the former Confederate IIXlved to Washington 
in 1866 with his wife. There he practiced law and watched public affairs. In 
a public letter of July 1867 he advised the white South Carolinians to comply 
with the recently passed Reconstruction Acts and befriend the blacks. There-
by, he maintained, the whites could preserve racial harllXlny and keep political 
power "in safe hands." He also cautioned his readers against antagonizing the 
Re publicans, who were now dominant. 38 
Most whites ignored this advice, while the newly franchised blacks spurned 
the overtures of a conservative white minority to form a coalition. The freed-
men provided the voting base for Republican rule, which came to South Carolina 
in 1868. The ~urn of events saddened Boyce, who commented in 1872 that the new 
regime was plundering his native state shamelessly. Three years later he 
remarked that universal black suffrage had proven a failure, and he wondered if 
the North might "profit by the lesson. 11 39 
Successful in his law practice, he spent his last years in retirement in 
Fairfax County, Virginia. He died in 1890.40 
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SOUTH CAROLINA LEADERSHIP IN THE SOUTHERN 
UNIFICATION MOVEMENT, 1849-1850 
by 
Thelma Jennings 
On the evening of December 22, 1848, sixty-nine southern Congressman, 
representing every slave state except Delaware, convened in the Senate chamber. 
John C. Calhoun, convinced that the South was on the verge of "the crisis of 
its fate," was perhaps the prime mover of this caucus which formally launched 
the southern ioovement for unity during the sectional crisis that followed the 
Mexican War.l His colleague, Senator Andrew P. Butler, however, later denied 
this on the floor of the Senate. According to Butler, the Southern movement 
originated with Senators Henry S. Foote of Mississippi and R. M. T. Hunter of 
Virginia.2 
As chairman of a conunittee of five who were instructed to prepare a state-
ment of the southern position, Calhoun penned one of his ablest state papers, 
the "Address of the Southern Delegates in Congress to their Constituents"--a 
powerful plea for unity. Although this address did not directly call for a 
southern convention, it hinted at the idea as a necessary future resort to 
combat northern aggression toward southern rights. Of a total representation 
of 121 from the slaveholding states, forty-eight Congressmen, including the 
entire South Carolina delegation, signed the Southern Address which was issued 
a month later. Only two of those who signed were Whigs, as the followers of 
the newly elected Taylor administration gave the movement little support in 
Congress.3 To them, it appeared as an attempt to disorganize ~h~ southern 
Whigs and perhaps compel General Taylor "to throw himself in the hands" of 
many southern Deioocrats. Robert Toombs, a prominent Georgia Whig representa-
tive, told Calhoun that the "union of the South was neither possible nor 
desirable" until southerners were ready to dissolve the Union. In his opinion 
the Whigs had "completely foiled" Calhoun in his attempt to form a southern 
party.4 
In the cotton states of the deep South, where necessity for action was 
more keenly felt~ the Southern Address met with ioore universal approval than in 
the upper South. But even in the lower South there were voices of dissent, 
and Calhoun's followers throughout the South expressed grave doubts concerning 
southern unification. Senator Herschel V. Johnson, one of Calhoun's most 
ardent supporters in Georgia, expressed the fear "that the people of the South 
are not properly awake to the danger--not thoroughly nerved to united resis-
tance. 116 According to Senator William R. King of Alabama, divisions aioong 
southerners themselves presented an obstacle to any satisfactory settlement of 
the slavery question by compromise. 1'breover, they encouraged the antislavery 
advocates "to persevere in their mad career; and where it is to terminate God 
only knows. 11 7 
In spite of the fact that the Virginia legislature had been in the fore-
front of opposition to any congressional restriction on slavery in the new 
31 
The South Carolina Historical Association 32 
territories, Richard K. Cralle, Calhoun's former confidential clerk, expressed 
doubts as to whether his state would live up to these legislative resolutions 
that had become a model for the remonstrances of the other slave states. He 
believed South Carolina would have to seek support from states farther South.a 
During February and March 1849, practically every South Carolina district 
and parish held public meetings, most of which provided for the appointment of 
Committees of Safety and Correspondence that communicated with one another and 
other states for the purpose of devising proper measures for colllIIPn safety. 
The Richland Committee of Safety and Correspondence invited the other district 
committees to send delegates to a meeting at Columbia.9 On May 14-15, this 
convention of 109 delegates approved the Southern Address, provided for a 
Central Committee of Vigilance and Safety consisting of five members, and 
recommended that a special session of the legislature be called in case Congress 
should pass any antislavery restrictions. But the delegates were reluctant to 
extend an invitation for a southern convention to consider joint action.10 
Because South Carolina was known for its radicalism, Calhoun and other state 
leaders thought it was desirable to prom:>te the unification movement in such a 
manner that the call for a southern convention would originate elsewhere.11 
Probably Mississippi was second to South Carolina in sentiment with regard 
to northern aggression and the fear of congressional interference.12 On May 7, 
a week before the Columbia meeting, a sizable number of citizens of central 
Mississippi met at Jackson. They adopted resolutions which requested all 
Mississippians to choose county delegates, equally from both political parties, 
to attend a convention at Jackson on the first M:>nday in October to reach 
united sentiment on the slavery question. Colin S. Tarpley, an ardent Hinds 
County Dem:>crat, sent the proceedings of the May meeting to Calhoun with the 
request for his opinion in regard to the proper course the October Convention 
should adopt.13 Calhoun replied that the fixed determination of the North to 
push the abolition requestions to the extreme left only one alternative for 
saving both the South and the Union--"a Southern Convention, and that if much 
longer delayed, cannot." The convention should be held the following autunm 
if possible; certainly it must not be delayed beyond the next year. Moreover, 
he indicated that no state was in a better position to assume leadership than 
Mississippi, and that the proper time for a general call would probably coin-
cide with the October convention.14 Writing to Senator Foote, Calhoun also 
urged that the October meeting is~ue the call for a southern convention--to 
save the Union is possible but at all events to save the South. Foote replied 
that several leaders of both political parties in the state had promised to act 
upon Calhonn 's recommendations at Jackson.15 
During the following year, both Tarpley and Foote, however, claimed the 
October Convention, without any instigation from Calhoun, had acted upon its 
own judgment in issuing the call for a southern convention to meet at Nashville 
on the first Monday in Jtme 1850. When Sam Houston, in a speech before the 
Senate on February 8, 1850, intimated South Carolina influenced Mississippi to 
issue the call, Senator Jefferson Davis joined his colleague in stoutly denying 
the charge. Davis proudly asserted that Mississippi looked to the leaders of 
no other state to direct her action.16 By December 1851, Foote frankly admit-
ted the Calhoun influence, but he never acknowledged that he was one of 
Calhoun's correspondents. He claimed that other correspondents' letters had 
satisfied him that the "modUb opeJtancu of the convention was m:>re or less 
marked out by his (Calhoun's) great intellect. 11 17 Even if some leaders in 
Mississippi had independently considered initiation of the call for the 
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southern convention, Calhoun's leadership was chiefly responsible. Yet the 
assertion of Mississippi leaders, that they acted in an independent manner, 
promoted the idea in the South in 1850 that a state other than South Carolina 
was entirely responsible for calling the convention. 
Al though it was desirable fo.r South Carolina to be among the last to 
respond to Mississippi's call, Calhoun did not think that his state "should 
hold back and wait for a movement of the other states." He urged James H. 
Hammond, a promin.ent state leader, to exert his influence on the meni>ers of 
the state legislature to appoint delegates.18 On the evening of Deceni>er 7, 
1849, the legislature met in caucus to initiate a response to the Mississippi 
call. Following a warm endorsement of the proposal, the caucus recommended a 
plan for an indirect election of two delegates from each of the seven congres-
sional districts. Three days later the caucus chose as delegates at large to 
the Nashville Convention: Langdon Cheves, Franklin H. Elmore, Robert W. Barn-
well, and James H. Hammond.19 
The introduction of Clay's Compromise resolutions and Webster's Seventh 
of March speech tended to offset the southern movement. If a settlement could 
be secured in Congress many southerners saw no necessity for a Southern Conven-
tion. Although some southern leaders felt that Webster's speech resulted in 
injury, the southern press in general applauded it. Calhoun also made his last 
plea to the Senate as the southern movement reached a peak about the first of 
March.20 
Some historians have expressed the opinion that only in Mississippi and 
South Carolina did public feeling seem to continue in favor of the convention. 
Even in Mississippi, as sentiment in favor of the compromise developed, the 
Whigs gave less support to the convention.21 Sentiment in South Carolina, 
however, did not change, and the proposed compromise was almost unanimously 
condemned in the state. The Charleston Me~ct..Vty declared that it was a growing 
conviction that Clay's proposals were a "snare", while the editor of the 
SpaJL.ta.n (Spartanburg) expressed his lack of faith in the committee especially 
when Clay became chairman. When the Charleston Cowu~ and a few Whigs in 
Charleston came out in favor of the Compromise, the SpaJL.ta.n severely assailed 
them.22 
What was the position of the old state Unionists of nullification days--
those individuals who had always been in the minority of South Carolina leader-
ship? Benjamin F. Perry, prominent Whig newspaper editor at Greenville, 
believed that the Compromise should be adopted. "But the whole state of South 
Carolina is opposed to it and a large portion of the state for disunion pe~ 
6e!!" he declared.23 Joel R. Poinsett, Union party leader on both state and 
national level, favored the Compromise and abhorred disunion as an alternative. 
Some of the Charleston leaders desired his conservative influence at the 
Nashville Convention to offset the hotspurs, but they decided that the public 
avowal of Poinsett's sentiments would render his election an impracticality. 
Poinsett came to the same conclusion, as he had long been aware that both the 
district and the state were prepared for the extremity. As he conscientiously 
believed disunion would lead to immediate civil war that would probably end in 
defeat for the South, he considered it wrong to yield to public opinion and by 
any act on his part to aid in the perpetration of destruction. But if revolu-
tion came--for there could be no peaceable secession--he was ready to take his 
stand for the South. Richard Yeadon, a former editor of the Charleston Cowu~, 
deplored dissolution of the Union, but he believed the passage of the Wilmot 
1
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Proviso or its equivalent would be a justifying cause. "I am no disunionist," 
declared Yeadon, but he was convinced that the South should make a resolute 
stand and present an impassable limit to northern aggression with disunion as 
a possible alternative. Old nullifiers and old Unionists were now with a few 
exceptions in agreement.24 
The "Voice of the South" for the past two decades or roore was silenced 
forever two months before the first Monday in June arrived. According to the 
New York He.Jr.ai_d, no hope existed now for the Nashville Convention. With 
Calhoun gone, the moral courage and unity of the South were gone.25 Writing to 
Hammond shortly thereafter, Virginia fire-eater, Beverley Tucker, remarked that 
Calhoun "died nobly and his last act redeemed all the errors of his life." He 
had heard of some who rejoiced in Calhoun's death as "providential," for they 
considered him "the moving cause in South Carolina." But Tucker continued, 
"You and I know that he restrained it, and restrained himself. 11 26 Actually, 
Calhoun had been unable to unify the South, and his position in his last speech 
was very nearly the same as those who believed that the time had come to dis-
solve the Union. It is impossible, however, to determine to what extent his 
loss affected the course of the Nashville Convention. 
Some of the most prominent leaders in South Carolina were aroong the dele-
gates chosen to the Nashville Convention.27 A closer look at the delegation in 
comparison with the other states' representatives, indicates that the group 
from the Palmetto State was perhaps the most talented, Mississippi alone 
excepted. One observer at the convention commented that South Carolina had 
"sent her jewels" there.28 At least eight of the seventeen delegates who 
attended were college graduates, while thirteen had been admitted to the bar 
and were practicing attorneys. A number of the delegates had distinguished 
public service careers. Thirteen were at some time in the state legislature 
and five (Robert Barnwell, James Hammond, Francis Pickens, Langdon Cheves, and 
Robert Barnwell Rhett) had served in the United States House of Representatives 
prior to their selection as delegates. Cheves had been Speaker of the House 
during the Thirtieth Congress. Barnwell, Hammond, and Rhett were later elected 
to the United States Senate. Before his selection, Hammond had served as 
governor of the state. R. F. W. Allston and Pickens later became the state's 
chief executive, with the latter serving during the secession crisis.29 
Al though it is probably safe to conclude that none of the South Carolina 
delegates would have hesitated as disunion in 1850, their views varied somewhat 
from extreme ultraism to qualified moderation. Rhett had even expressed sorrow 
to Calhoun that there was no chance for the Wilmot Proviso or the abolition of 
slavery in the District of Coluni>ia to be enacted by Congress. He wished to 
God northerners would do both and precipitate the contest in order that it 
might be ended "once and forever"--a contest that would accomplish "our emanci-
pation instead of that of our slaves." Though Rhett had taken little part in 
the activities leading to the convention, he had begun "to assume the air of a 
prophet justified" by the time it met. 30 David F. Jamison, who would later 
serve as president of the South Carolina secession convention, argued that 
slavery was the indispensable basis for a successful Republic, and that the 
abolitionary campaign and the excesses of northern democracy made separation 
as necessary as it was desirable. 31 
On the other hand Pickens was following a somewhat more moderate line of 
Southern cooperation-a viewpoint that was not as ultra as some of his asso-
ciates. He advocated the preservation of the Union provided that southern 
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rights and honor did not perish in the attempt. No one should look to disunion 
or desire it pVt f.,e_ for it should be avoided if possible.32 
The theme of southern nationalism extends throughout Hammond's extensive 
correspondence for this period.33 Pickens expressed the belief to Benjamin 
Perry that both Hammond and Cheves were bitter against the Union. And Hannnond 
himself declared that if the convention did not open the way to dissolution he 
preferred that it never meet. To Calhoun he expressed the opinion that he was 
very much opposed to any address to the North and another address to the South 
was unnecessary. "A very short preamble and a couple of resolutions"--which 
he confided he had already drawn up--would be sufficient. The substance of 
these resolutions, as stated in his diary, formulated a plan for a General 
Congress of Southern delegates empowered by dissolve the Union and organize a 
new government. Whether he proposed them at Nashville would depend on circum-
stances, as he had not intention of making a fool of himself or acting pre-
maturely. On the eve of his departure for the convention, Hannnond confided to 
his diary, "I am loth (sic) to go believing nothing will be done to re)ay the 
trouble. But as something important may be done it is my duty to go." 4 
The Southern Convention assembled at Nashville on Monday, June 3, 1850, 
with 175 delegates representing nine states. From the beginning, the general 
policy of the seventeen member South Carolina delegation was to remain quiet, 
giving the lead to others, and thus dissipating the prejudice against "South 
Carolina dictation." Hammond confided to his diary that Pickens and Rhett were 
for speaking and being active, while he, Cheves, and Barnwell were opposed with 
most of the delegation supporting the latter.35 The morning session of the 
second day revealed that Pickens was not content to remain silent. A long and 
spirited debate occurred in which Pickens participated. Speaking in "a very 
antimated manner," he emphasized sovereign state equality and concluded with 
"equality now and forever or independence." 36 
The last two days of the convention were marked by vigorous debate and 
several important speeches, that centered around Rhett's address to the people 
of the slaveholding states exclusive of Delaware. In a stirring and eloquent 
speech, Pickens replied to an Alabama delegate who opposed the radicalism of 
the address. Though attempting to repeal the idea that the convention's object 
was to dissolve the Union, Pickens indicated that the people of the southern 
states were looking to the assemblage to attend to their rights. With all 
acting together the Union could never be dissolved; a middle or halfway ground 
might result in disunion.37 During the afternoon session of the last day, 
Hammond replied to President William Sharkey of Mississippi in defense of the 
address. In conclusion he declared the South "had no thing to do but to march 
forward in one unbroken column to equality in th.e Union, or independence out 
of it. .,33 
Finally, the address, amended as proposed by Gideon J. Pillow of Tennessee, 
was unanimously adopted, as well as twenty-eight resolutions. The proposal to 
extend the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific was the most significant 
resolution. The final one provided for a reassembling of the convention at 
Nashville on the sixth Monday after the adjournment of Congress. Although 
Rhett's address as adopted was still rore radical than the resolutions, the 
moderates had won at Nashville by adopting a wait-and-see attitude.39 
What was the reaction of the South Carolina delegates to the convention 
that their "old statesman" had fathered? Hammond was hopeful for the future as 
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South Carolina had succeeded in her policy and laid the foundations for wield-
ing great influence among the other states.40 Pickens declared that his state 
asked no favors and made no threats; she was content to follow the leadership 
of others.41 To a Charleston audience on June 22, George A. Trenholm expressed 
his conviction that great things had been achieved in bringing the South to-
gether in common council. After Trenholm's speech, Rhett foretold "the 
beginning of a Revolution" as Congress would reject the demand of the Nashville 
Convention and the North would continue its agitation. Discarding whatever 
restraint had bound him at the convention, Rhett now openly and without reser-
vation declared himself a disunionist. A few days later, Hammond expressed 
the fear that Rhett's speech would destroy 1the good effect of South Carolina's 
policy at Nashville.42 
By the last days of Septeni:>er the Compromise of 1850 had become five laws 
of the land. The passage of the Compromise measures tended only to increase 
disunion sentiment in South Carolina and to bring it more into the open. But 
Governor Whitemarsh Seabrook indicated that he would wait for the movement of 
Georgia and that of one or two other southern states before collUlrltting South 
Carolina. To call a special session of the Nashville C-0nvention would embar-
rass the proceedings of that body. 43 
Beyond a doubt South Carolina was more interested in the reasseni:>ling of 
the Nashville Convention than any other state. Yet even in the Palmetto State, 
there was a difference of opinion; lines were being drawn between the coopera-
tionists, who opposed secession unless the South was united, and the immediate 
secessionists, who favored single state action. Some looked to the convention 
as the first step leading to a Southern Congress with full authority from the 
states, while others had little faith in a second session.44 Before the pass-
age of the Compromise, Barnwell had written Hammond, "As for Nashville we must 
go there if South Carolina goes alone she must go, her whole delegation." He 
urged Hammond to prepare an address for the next session and send it to some-
one in Mississippi to be presented, for South Carolina must not appear in the 
matter. By Septeni>er 30, Hammond had decided, however, that a second session 
of the convention would be at least a farce and declared he would not attend.45 
Only fifty-nine delegates representing seven southern states traveled to 
Nashville for the second session of the convention. Over one-third of them 
had not been present in June, and these new menbers were generally more radical 
in their views. The Palmetto state had the largest and most representative 
group with sixteen members. Unlike the June meeting, the "ultras" gained 
controi.46 John L. Marling, editor of the Nashville Gaze.tie, was convinced 
that the delegates from all the states except Tennessee cherished feelings of 
deadly hostility to the Union. But South Carolina with her "supple and 
cunning statesmen" was the moving power. 4 7 
Perhaps it was altogether fitting that Langdon Cheves, dean of the South 
Carolina delegation, made the one outstanding address at the second session. 
He had prepared a two or three hour speech, which he read, to sustain his 
resolution that secession was the only remedy for the wrongs of the South. 
Beginning with the admission of California--"fraudulent, insulting, tyranni-
cal"--he catalogued the wrongs the South had endured at northern hands. 
"There is no doubt they have abolished the Constitution," he declared. "The 
carcass may remain, but the spirit has left. • • • It stinks in our nostrils." 
The only remedy lay in united secession of the slaveholding states. "Nothing 
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the Union is already dissolved." If four or five adjoining states would unite 
he did not think the enemy would venture to attack; any war made on the South 
was unauthorized by the Constitution. He concluded with a stroke of eloquence: 
"O ~ great God, unite us, and a tale of submission shall never be told. 11 48 
Cheves' prayer remained unanswered in 1850, as the movement for southern 
unity collapsed. The crisis had passed; the South acquiesced on conditions, 
and the Union was saved. Even in South Carolina the Unionists, with the 
support of the cooperationists, triumphed the following year over the question 
of the acceptance of the Compromise .49 Delighted with the turn of events, 
James L. Petigru, low country Unionist, wrote Webster the! had "taken the state 
from Rhett and broken as I think the spell Calhoun left." 0 No state would 
follow South Carolina and she was unwilling to follow Rhett's leadership in 
seceding alone. 
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'"SOUL OF THE SOUTH': JAMES F. BYRNES AND THE 
RACIAL ISSUE IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1911-1941" 
by 
Winfred B. Moore, Jr. 
Since the first settlement at Jamestown, one of the most important issues 
confronting southern politicians has been the hai.mting problem of race rela-
tions. One of the southern politicians who had to deal with this issue was 
James F. Byrnes of South Carolina (1882-1972), who became one of the most 
influential men in American government during the first half of the twentieth 
century. This paper will examine the manner in which Byrnes addressed racial 
issues as a U.S. Congressman from 1911 to 1925 and as a U.S. Senator from 1931 
to 1941. It is hoped that this examination will help to illuminate the forces 
which shaped Byrnes's racial thought and the impact he exerted on American race 
relations in the years which spanned from the Progressive Era through the New 
Deal.l 
In 1910, James F. Byrnes of Aiken was elected to Congress from South 
Carolina's second congressional district, representing a seven county area 
along the Savannah River which was once described as "the damndes t ..• nigger-
shootingest, sinfullest place in South Carolina." By that year, the politi-
cally observant Byrnes had been exposed to the virulent white racism of this 
home district of Benjamin R. Tillman and to the relatively less virulent, 
"Bourbon" variety of racism associated with Charleston, his home before moving 
to Aiken in 1900. Whichever view he foi.md more appealing, Byrnes probably 
tmderstood from his early political observations that nearly every white 
Carolinian was firmly committed to white supremacy and that any successful 
politician in his state had to have an acceptable position on the explosive 
racial issue. 2 
At least by the time he arrived on Capitol Hill in 1911, Byrnes had such a 
position. The foundation of this position was Byrnes's belief that blacks were 
inherently inferior to whites, that white supremacy must be maintained, and 
that recognition of these two principles formed the only acceptable status quo 
in southern race relations. From that fotmdation, he endorsed disfranchisement 
and segregation as the best means not only to safeguard this status quo but 
also to promote the maximum welfare of both races. For whites, Byrnes reasoned 
that this solution freed them to divide politically and pursue reform without 
fear of political or social interference from blacks. As. long as blacks did 
not challenge this solution, Byrnes felt that it also worked to their best 
interests by reducing interracial tension and establishing a "racial peace" 
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whites. For Byrnes, therefore, white paternalism and black subordination with-
in a clearly defined, unchallenged framework of white supremacy constituted the 
ideal state of race relations. Accordingly, Byrnes dedicated himself to defend-
ing this ideal state from what he felt were the disruptive attacks of "unscru-
pulous" southern race-bai ters on his right as well as "misguided" national 
reformers on his left. Whether or not Byrnes would have expressed his racial 
policy in these terms, it appears to have been such a policy that guided his 
political conduct from 1911 to 1941.3 
The outlines of this policy began to emerge during the Carolinian's first 
eight years in the House. It was during those years that Byrnes acquired a 
justified reputation as a southern "Progressive" by supporting most of the 
reform legislation advocated by President Woodrow Wilson. Given his strong 
support of Wilson, it seems to be significant that racial issues were often 
involved on those few occasions when Byrnes opposed the President. One of the 
reasons Byrnes supported a more restrictive immigration law than the President 
advocated in 1914 was the Carolinian's fear that undesireable ethnic groups 
from southern and eastern Europe might "mingle" with Negroes "and so aggravate 
our race problem as to make it hopeless." Among Byrnes 's objections to the 
Child Labor Act of 1916 was his belief that it established a precedent for 
federal regulation of labor practices which eventually could be used to attack 
racial segregation and discrimination in southern industries. Similarly, one 
factor in the Congressman's initial opposition to the Military Conscription 
Act of 1917 was his assessment that it did not specifically exclude the War 
Department from assigning "a boy from South Carolina ••. to serve ••. by the side 
of a Negro from Indiana." If that happened, Byrnes stated, America "would not 
have to go to Europe for war." Al though these were the only major occasions 
on which Byrnes mentioned race during his early House career, they documented 
his sensitivity to protecting white supremacy from potential national threats 
even amidst the pro-southern racial policies of Woodrow Wilson.4 
Beginning in 1919, Republican control of Congress, increased racial vio-
lence, and the emergence of the more assertive "New Negro" convinced Byrnes 
that much greater national threats to southern racial policies had developed. 
The first public expression of these heightened racial concerns came in a 
speech to the House on August 25, 1919, when Byrnes delivered the Dk)St inflam-
matory racial remarks of his legislative career. Commenting on the widespread 
racial violence of that sulIIIller, Byrnes placed the blame for these disturbances 
on the "incendiary" publications of Negro "radicals" such as W. E. B. DuBois. 
Byrnes stated that these radicals had "deliberately planned a campaign of 
violence" to spread the "seditious" doctrines of bolshevism, socialism, and 
racial equality. To stop radical activities, Byrnes suggested that certain 
black publications be banned from U.S. post offices and that revolutionaries 
be deported. To refute radical ideas, the Carolinian cited references which 
ranged from "God Almighty" to Abraham Lincoln to himself in an attempt to 
prove that southern blacks were inferior to whites, neither wanted nor needed 
racial equality, and were "pros~ering as never before in the history" of their 
race because of white guidance. 
In the ominous climax of that speech, Byrnes hinted that an armageddon 
might be approaching for those blacks who ignored his advice: 
If the two races are to live together in this country it 
may as well be understood that the war has in no way changed 
the attitude of the white man toward the social and political 
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equality of the negro •••• If by reason of his experience 
he seeks social and political equality with the white man 
but refuses to consider leaving for parts where it will 
willingly be given to him, and cherishes the hope that 
by violence it can be gained here, he can not too quickly 
realize that there are in this country 90,000,000 white 
people determined not to extend ••• equality to 10,000,000 
negroes and a resort to violence must inevitably bring 
to the negro the greater suffering. 
44 
While expressing his hope that conservative blacks would help paternalistic 
whites avoid such a confrontation, Byrnes concluded unequivocally that America 
was "a white man's country and will always remain a white man's country. 11 6 
If Byrnes was opposed to violence, he made it clear in a letter to W.W. 
Ball in January, 1920, that he was also opposed to more peaceful avenues of 
racial reform such as allowing black Americans to exercise their right to vote. 
Byrnes warned Ball that the federal government might try to supervise the 
registration of women voters under the pending women's suffrage amendment. What 
concerned the Congressman about such a development was the prospect that 
recently established N.A.A.C.P. Chapters in South Carolina might try to persuade 
the government to supervise registration of black voters at the same time. At 
the end of this letter, Byrnes reminded Ball why Carolinians had to be vigilant 
on this as well as other issues: 
••• it is certain that it there was a fair registration they 
(blacks) would have a slight majority in our state. We cannot 
idly brush the facts aside. Unfortunate though it may be, our 
consideration of every question must include the consideration 
of this race question.7 
"nlis "consideration" was very evident the following year when Byrnes spoke 
against the Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill, a measure which proposed to conbat lynching 
by making it a federal crime. Byrnes's central argument against this bill was 
that it represented an unnecessary, impractical, and unconstitutional usurpation 
of state jurisdiction over the crime of murder. Byrnes contended that such 
unwarranted federal interference mig)at disrupt, and could not improve, the 
"harmonious state of race relations" existing in his region. While expressing 
his disgust with 100b violence, Byrnes asserted that Negro rape of white women 
was the premier cause of lynching. Accordingly he felt that the curtailment of 
this crime, not an anti-lynching law, was the best way to prevent 100b violence. 
Presumably, Byrnes had such preventive cures in mind in 1922 when he castigated 
President Warren Harding for appointing a Negro registrar of the treasury 
''where more than 100 white women are employed. 11 8 
Having objected to violence, voting, and anti-lynching laws as methods of 
liberalizing the racial status quo, Byrnes turned his attention to education in 
1924 and 1925. "nle subject of Byrnes 's remarks was a proposed federal appro-
priation for Howard University, a major center of black student activism during 
the 1920's. In these remarks, Byrnes told the House that federal funding of 
any private university was inappropriate. Howard was especially unworthy, he 
continued, because some of its representatives advocated "socialism," "racial 
equality," and other ideas designed to "poison the minds of their students, 
••• make them discontented with their lot in life, and disturb the har100nious 
relations now existing." If his colleagues merely wanted to give money to a 
-.. 
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black college, Byrnes reasoned that Hampton, Tuskeegee, or other colleges with 
a self-help, non-protest, orientation would be a better selection than Howard. 
Should his colleagues persist in granting funds to Howard, Byrnes argued that 
they should at least "exercise some control" over that institution. Combined 
with his other activities in the House, these Congressional valedictory remarks 
on race made it clear that white supremacy had few defenders more committed 
than James F. Byrnes.9 
If some observers of his House career were inclined to dismiss Byrnes as 
merely a typical southern race-baiter, however, they may have been surprised 
by his various primary election campaigns, especially those for the U.S. Senate. 
Race was not a major factor in his congressional election campaigns. Neither 
was race a dominant factor in Byrnes's first campaign for the Senate in 1924 
when his ioost formidable opponent was the archetypal South Carolina demagogue, 
Coleman L. Blease. Perhaps because Byrnes, Nathaniel B. Dial, and John McMahan 
engaged in a fratricidal struggle for the "anti-Blease" vote, Blease remained 
uncharacteristically subdued throughout the summer. Byrnes campaigned on the 
"issues," his congressional record, and said little about race. Although he 
mentioned his stand on the Howard University appropriations, Byrnes also ad-
vocated bonus payments to black war veterans because "we must treat them justly 
and right." In congruence with this relatively moderate stand on race in 
Carolina politics, Byrnes refused a Grand Kleagle's offer to become a secret 
member of the Ku Klux Klan. The resentment which this refusal generated among 
the South Carolina Klan may have been one factor in Byrnes's razor-thin loss to 
Blease in the runoff primary.10 
The racial issue was more prominent in the Senate campaign of 1930 when 
Blease was challenged by Byrnes and Leon Harris. With his campaign apparently 
stagnating, Blease raised the racial issue in a meeting at Union on July 7, 
when he seized upon a recent lynching in that city as an opportunity to deliver 
one of his rousing "To Hell with the Constitution" speeches, sanctioning mob 
violence against suspected Negro rapists. Shortly thereafter, a campaign flyer 
was circulated throughout the state warning that "Negroes Pray for Blease's 
Defeat, How will S. C. Deioocrats Answer?" with the obvious implication that 
Byrnes and Harris were not orthodox on the racial issue. Blease's supporters 
made other appeals to racial passions throughout the campaign.11 · 
In vivid contrast to Blease, Byrnes refused to engage in racial epithets. 
Rather, he campaigned on his congressional record, discussed problems created 
by the Great Depression, and outlined how he would attack these problems as a 
senator. After suffering through Blease's theatrics, Byrnes told audiences 
that "no one believes in racial equality," that white supremacy was not en-
dangered in South Carolina, and that one could not teach Negroes respect for 
the law by "hanging them to a telephone pole." Accordingly, Byrnes argued that 
it was foolish for Carolinians to support individuals who dwelled on a non-
existent race problem when more vital problems awaited their attention. During 
the depression years, such pleas apparently struck a responsive chord. South 
Carolina gave Byrnes a 4500 vote mandate over B1ease in the runoff primary. 
Byrnes justified this mandate in the Senate by becoming nationally recognized 
as a staunch supporter of New Deal measures, a personal "favorite" of Franklin 
Roosevelt, and perhaps the President's most valuable legislative whip on 
Capitol Hill. 12 
Despite this constructive record, Byrnes challenged by Thomas P. Stoney 
and William C. Harllee in the Senate primary of 1936. Both of these men 
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attacked the Senator's association with what they felt were the New Deal's 
dangerously liberal policies in general and racial policies in particular. 
Tileir focus on race became most pronounced when Byrnes failed to join E. D. 
Smith and other Carolina delegates who "walked out" of that year's Democratic 
Convention in protest against black participation at the convention. While 
complete details of the walkout were filtering back to South Carolina, Stoney 
heatedly warned campaign audiences that blacks were controlling the Democratic 
Party and that the New Deal was promoting racial equality. If there had been 
any doubt that Byrnes was a willing accessory to these crimes, Stoney argued 
that the Senator's cowardly failure to join Smith at Philadelphia had removed 
it. Although such attacks continued throughout the summer, they reached a 
repulsive climax on July 7 when photographs of the black delegates were dis-
tributed to the audience and a postcard was circulated throughout the state 
claiming that: 
A vote for Roosevelt and Byrnes means the day is coming 
closer when dirty, evil smelling negroes will be going to 
church with you, your sister, your wife, or your mother. 
Busses, trains, hotels, picture shows, bathing beaches 
will all see the negroes rubbing shoulders with your 
loved ones. From this it will only be a step when negroes 
will be allowed to pro~ose wedlock to white girls. All 
under Roosevelt laws. l 
Privately, Byrnes had anticipated such accusations and told several of his 
constituents why he thought they were ridiculous. Byrnes viewed his opponents' 
charges as regrettable, if familiar, examples of racial demagoguery designed 
"to prevent the advancement of the interests of the laboring people" when there 
w11~ not "the slightest danger of negro domination in South Carolina." It was 
true, Byrnes admitted, that the New Deal had helped blacks more than any pre-
ceding administration. However, he argued that this help was because any 
effort ,to aid the nation's poor inevitably "spilled over" to help blacks and 
not because the Democrats were promoting racial equality. In regard to the 
events at Philadelphia, Byrnes felt that it was not only hypocritical but also 
dangerous~for southerners to critcize northern electoral procedures, which 
permitted ·'the election of a few blacks, if the South did not want to invite 
northern interference with southern electoral procedures, which prevented any 
meaningful bla~k participation.14 
Publicly, Byrnes repeated many of these themes while vigorously defending 
the *ew Deal. At Charleston, the diminutive Senator confidently restated what 
had been the theme of ~11 his senate campaigns: 
I shall appeal t~ your reason and intelligence and not to your 
prejudices. I beli,eve that during the last twenty-five years, 
we have devoted too much time to ... 'likker' and 'nigger' and 
too little to those matters which vitally affect the welfare of 
the people. In your heact and mine there are certain prejudices. 
It is the duty of a good man to control and subdue these preju-
dices. I have no respect for the man, who, for political gain, 
will seek to arouse the prejudices of the people. I believe 
the time has come ... when a man can appeal to the best that 
is in us instead of the worst. 
If Byrnes represented the "best" that was in Carolina, this assessment was 
-
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correct for in 1936 he won the largest majority in the history of his state's 
Dem:>cratic primary.15 
Byrnes's conduct in his election campaigns and in his first Senate term 
may have caused some people to conclude that he had softened his position on 
race since his days in the House. During those years, Byrnes had pursued the 
admirable, perhaps courageous, policy of trying to cool racial passions and 
discredit counterproductive demagoguery so that necessary action could be taken 
on other important issues. While promoting action on many such issues from 
1924 to 1936, however, Byrnes's relative m:>deration on race was not caused by 
any major change in his racial philosophy. Rather, this moderation was caused 
by the fact that he perceived no real threats to the racial status quo either 
in South Carolina or the national government during those years. After 1936, 
the rising power of blacks in the Dem:>cratic Party led Byrnes to conclude that 
a real threat had emerged in Washington. Although his racial objections were 
less frequent and less strident than those of many southern politicians, the 
Carolinian's actions from 1937 to 1941 indicated that" he had lost none of his 
committment to white supremacy.16 
Beginning in 1937, Byrnes increasingly opposed Roosevelt's domestic poli- / 
cies because he felt the President was transforming the New Deal from a justi-
fiable "emergency" philosophy of government to an unjustifiable "permanent" 
philosophy of American government. Many of the senator's disagreements with 
his party had racial overtones. From 1937 onward, one of the Carolinian's 
reasons for trying to reform and eventually terminate the Works Progress 
Administration was his belief that most of its funds were being allocated to 
influence votes in "doubtful" northern states. Without reform, Byrnes felt 
that the solidly Dem:>cratic South would never get its proportionate share of / 
relief funds because "our negro problem prevents us from dividing political) · 
and, therefore, qualifying as "doubtful" states. Similarly, one of B~rn-. .s 
. ards 
objections to the national minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor S 
Act was his knowledge that "this wage would have to be paid to every · 0 
working in any store as well as to white employees. 1117 f,;' 
., · mpact on 
Byrnes's increasing concern with th~ New Deal's potentially .,a ation 
the racial status quo was more clearly displayed in a bitter confr_91ri th 
with Will Alexander, director of the Farm Security Administrati~~ apwiet 
autumn of 1937, Byrnes received word that Alexander was planniu d the ~tn· ~ 
. fue ,. l.Vl.-few black representatives to the state committees which supe 1. g lett 
,_- ng n '1:5 ro 
ties of the F.S.A. On October 9 and 27, the senator wrote. that no otheiNew 
Alexander protesting this policy change. He told Alexan{u1d be viewed a!;an 
Deal agency had taken such action in the South, that ~~~ whites had allays 
attempt to court black votes in the North, and that ~f tically in•·ir 
. ...: ter sarcas "' -
~reated blacks fairly without such representation. ' Ba tists, Irishmen, 
ing if Alexander thought it necessary to appoint'. 1ews' Ph F S A boards 
· oups to t e . • • , 
and representatives of other special interest .r because it raised "the 
Byrnes asked Alexander to abandon the propos,-.i change d rousing un-
great danger of impairing the effectivene~Pof your p:ofra~h:1be:t feeling 
fortunate feelings between the races wher- today · • • n Y ing Byrnes contacted Henry 
exists." When Alexander disregarded th's warn • A •"i 
's su erior. ccoi" ng Wallace who as Secretary of Agricui,ure, was Alexander P f 
' ' h f his senatorial power aga 1'$t to Alexander Byrnes threatened to ...,;e so muc O k d 
' 11 w 11 " who "just tuc e the Agriculture Department that it scared Henry ~ ace d dded "I never 
his tail and turned to the high dni>er right away· Alexan er a i ' f 
" s h re the penalt es or did get my Negroes on the state committees. uc we 
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challenging the vital interests of a powerful senator.18 
From Byrnes's perspective, even greater threats to these vital interests 
were the recurring attempts to pass federal anti-lynching legislation such as 
the Wagner-Costigan Anti-Lynching Bill of 1935. At that time, the Carolinian 's 
remarks against this type of legislation were relatively restrained. He 
offered his standard constitutional objections to such bills, presented a 
persuasive critique of what he felt were the mechanical deficiencies of this 
particular bill, and cited the declining nuni>er of lynchings as evidence that 
a federal law could not improve the "harmonious" race relations already exist-
ing in the South. After the defeat of this bill, Byrnes used his power as 
Chairman of the Audit and Control Committee to kill appropriations necessary 
for the conduct of a proposed senatorial investigation of lynching in 1936.19 
To the Carolinian 's dismay, this issue was resurrected by the Wagner-Van 
Nuys Anti-Lynching Bill of 1938. On January 11, 1938, Byrnes addressed the 
Senate on this proposed legislation. Upset by the nagging persistence of the 
lynching issue and the rising power of blacks in the Democratic Party, the 
usually charming and res trained junior senator from South Carolina took that 
occasion to deliver his angriest public remarks on race since his days in the 
House. These remarks deviated from his standard objections to anti-lynching 
laws to label the pending bill as one designed to "arouse ill-feeling between 
the sections, inspire race hatred in the South, and destroy the Democratic 
Party." Al though emphasizing his disgust for lynching, Byrnes asked the nation 
to recognize that it was northern slave traders and the "evils of Reconstruc-
tion" which had imposed racial problems on the South while it was the rape of 
"innocent girls" by a few criminal Negroes which "in a majority of the cases" 
~oduced the tragic phenomenon of lynching.20 
·~at shocked Byrnes most about this legislation was the increased willing-
ness ·c. d th 
11 i f~orthern Democrats to join Republicans, the N.A.A.C.P., an o er m sgu a ,. 
1 ti •,d agitators who supported it. From his premise that southern race re a ons· · 
i 1 , \•ere "harmonious", Byrnes deduced that the only possible reason for h s par .. -. 
desire 0 't 8 ,ddenly abandoning the South on this vital issue was the selfish ihCO'fiardly Northern Democrats to court the black vote . In a dramatic paragra ,, 
1 • ,trnes told the Senate that the South had become the victim of a 
revo u on ~the Democratic Party: 
' · 
It i ~ , 
th S ' t,>ub tedly true th at the unity of the white people in 
th: b:~i~£n supporting the Democratic Party has been due to 
soul of th~ hat when problems affecting the Negro and the very 
of the Nor h "-o uth arose, they could depend upon the Democrats 
11 tl t <> rally to their support .•. southern Democrats may as we rea ize L __ f --w that a change has taken place .•• today 90 
per~~~t O the Neg\,es of the North •.. are voting for Democratic 
~an a:es . · .The Neg1, has not only come into the Democratic 
arty, ut the Negro h a. (also) come into control of the 
Democratic Party.21 
With his voice rising in 1 
, :lnted at w 1 vo ume, 1.vrnes turned to the Senate gallery, l ite of di : ~~r White, the executive S,cretary of the N.A.A.C.P., and accused c a ng policy to the U.S. Senat-e It was not so much the anti-
ynching bill but th th f · • 
ra er e uture implications of White's "awesome power" 
which alarmed the S t 
· ean or most. While starinl. at White Byrnes asked the 
questions which had historically frightened most white ;outherners: 
Soul of the South 
What legislation will he next demand of the Congress? ••• 
Will he demand to protect Negroes in the right to stop at 
hotels where white persons are entertained... Will he 
demand ••• laws providing for the supervision of elections 
within the States ••• I know he will make other demands 
and those who are willing to vote for this bill .•• will 
acquiesce in his subsequent demands. 
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With penetrating clarity, the Senator's speech correctly identified the 
ultimate goals of the black leadership and the long-range trends of the Demo-
cratic Party. But it over-estimated White's immediate political power. On 
January i1, 1938, the anti-lynching bill died at the hands of a southern fili-
buster.2 
Although Byrnes had other minor involvements with racial issues prior to 
his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1941, the "soul of the South" speech 
was a revealing climax to his pre-1941 treatment of racial issues as well as a 
foreshadowing of his conduct as Governor of South Carolina and his break with 
the national De!IJ)cratic Party during the Truman Administration. As defined by 
Byrnes·, segregation, disfranchisement, and white supremacy were the "very soul 
of the South." To his credit, Byrnes was not an archetypal demagogue in pro-
moting these ends. Because he discerned no significant threats to white 
supremacy from the South, Byrnes often opposed southern race-baiters who in-
hibited constructive action on other issues and threatened to cause further 
damage to race relations. In Washington, Byrnes did not let racial obsessions 
prevent him from becoming one of the !IJ)St talented, constructive, and respected 
southern politicians of his day. Indeed, he often presented the image of a man 
who would have preferred to escape the racial issue altogether. But Byrnes 
could not escape that issue and when confronted with what he felt to be a major 
threat to white supremacy, he attacked that threat as vigorously as any white 
man. He either could not or would not reject the racist myths held by most 
whites. He refused to recognize the deplorable conditions under which most 
black Carolinians existed as well as legitimate black aspirations to basic 
constitutional rights. As such, Byrnes did not see that the racial peace of 
which he often spoke was an illusion and that there could be little ioore than 
a temporary truce until the policies of white supremacy were abandoned. If 
Byrnes did not make race relations appreciably worse, neither did he make them 
appreciably better. When it came his turn to address the haunting issue of 
race, therefore, Byrnes addressed it in much the same fashion as had genera-
tions of white southerners before him.23 
To look at Byrnes through the prism of racial issues is to see him in his 
ioost unfavorable light. He accomplished much that was constructive despite his 
deficient attitudes on race. Given the history and politics of his region, it 
may be expecting too much of Byrnes to think that he could have pursued a 
racial policy radically different from the one he chose. Nevertheless, this 
qualification does not seem to diminish the tragedy of men such as Byrnes who 
perhaps achieved neither the full degree of national recognition nor the level 
of constructive leadership to which their abilities might otherwise have led 
them. Speaking about southern politicians in general, Ralph McGill wrote an 
epitaph which may be fitting for Byrnes in particular: 
Out of this melancholy deterioration (in race relations) came 
a Greek tragedy that has never left the South's political 
stage ••. The South has continued to send a nUIIDer of really 
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able men to Congress... To survive politically they were 
required to conform to the mores of their states. They 
could never fully attain the national respect and stature 
for which they so admirably were equipped. The most excel-
lent of these were fully competent to have become Presidents 
of their country. Yet, their states demanded of them that 
they • • . go cotm ter to the mainstream of national life and 
values; and proclaim, instead, the virtues of white supremacy ••• 
The most ab le and honorable of them were condemned • • • like 
Sisyphus, eternally to push an unrewarding stone up the hills 
of bitterness. 
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As enbodied by James F. Byrnes from 1911 to 1941, the collective souls of white 
folks were apparently not yet equal to the task of freeing themselves from the 
tragedy of this self-imposed burden.24 
1Although the generally accepted date of Byrnes's birth is May 2, 1879, 
both City of Charleston and St. Patrick's Catholic Church records indicate that 
his date of birth was May 2, 1882. Other evidence also suggests that 1879 was 
not the correct year of his birth. Byrnes always acknowledged that his sister, 
Leonore, was older than he and that his father died a few weeks before his son's 
birth. City of Charleston records cite Leonore's birthday as Decenber 14, 1879 
and his father's date of death as March 18, 1882. A possible explanation for 
this apparent misrepresentation may be related to Byrnes's acquisition of the 
job of court stenographer for the S.C. 2nd Circuit Court in 1900. Presumably, 
the age requirement for this job was twenty-one. My moving his date of birth 
back three years, an eighteen year old Byrnes could have met this age require-
ment in 1900. See "Record of Births, City of Charleston" (Charleston Cotmty 
Library) V-43, p. 358. "Baptism Registorium, 1881-1892" (St. Patrick's Church, 
Charleston, S.C.), p. 14. 
Anvng the other public offices held by Byrnes were those of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice (1941-1942), "Economic Stabilizer" and Director of War Mobiliza-
tion (1942-1945), U.S. Secretary of State (1945-1947), and Governor of S.C. 
(1951-1955). 
For a more detailed analysis of Byrnes's legislative career, see W.B. Moore, 
Jr., "New South Statesman: The Political Career of James Francis Byrnes, 1911-
1941." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1975). 
2James F. Byrnes, Alt in One Li6e:time (New York, 1958), pp. 13-20. (Here-
inafter cited as Byrnes, Li6e:time). Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, "Sly and 
Able." SatuJr..day Evening P0.6.t. 213, (July 20, 1940): 38. The counties included 
in the second congressional district were Aiken, Beaufort, Hampton, Bamberg, 
Saluda, Barnwell and Edgefield. Anvng the many treatments of racial policies 
followed by Bourbons and Tillmanites are William J. Cooper, The Coru.e1tva-t<.ve 
Regime: South CaJW.li.rra., 1877-1890 (Baltimore, 1968) and George B. Tindall, 
South CaJW.li.rra. Neg~oeo: 1877-1900 (Colunbia, 1952). 
3cong~eL>~iona1 Rec.o~d, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 486-88. (Herein-
after cited as CR). 
4 CR, 63rd Congress, 1st Session, pp. 5571-72, 2nd Session, pp. 2711-12, 
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64th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1576-78, 1602-05, 65th Congress, 1st Session, 
pp. 1098-1102. 
5cR, 66th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 4303-05. 
6Ibid. 
7Byrnes to W.W. Ball, January 18, 1920. William Watts Ball Manuscripts, 
Perkins Library, Duke University. N.A.A.C.P. is the abbreviation for the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 
8CR, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 543-45. Columbia S;ta,t,e, August 18, 
1922. The anti-lynching bill passed the House but was killed by a Senate 
filibuster. 
9CR, 68th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1659-61, 4095-103, 2nd Session, 
pp. 244-46, 5055-56. Robert H. Brisbane, The Bla.eR VanguaJtd: 0Jugin.6 06 the 
NegM Soual. RevolU-tion, 1900-1960 (Valley Forge, 1970), pp. 101-112. Congress 
had been appropriating money for Howard for approximately fifty years and 
continued to do so despite Byrnes's complaints. 
lOcolumbia Sta.-te, June 17-25, July 2-30, August 29, 31, September 3, 7, 9, 
1924. Byrnes to Frank Hogan, October 13, 1937, "Campaign Circular," September 
7, 1924. James F. Byrnes Manuscripts. Cooper Library, Clemson University . 
(Hereinafter cited as Byrnes MSS). Byrnes lost to Blease by approximately 2200 
out of 200,000 votes cast. 
11columbia S;ta,t,e, July 8, 19-31, August 5-16, 20-27, 1930. "Campaign 
Circular," July 19 30, Byrnes to William Burguson, July 9, 19 30, Byrnes MSS. 
12Greenville New¢, July 9-11, September 6-11, 1930. Columbia S;ta,t,e, July 8, 
9, 18, 1930. "Radio Speech," Septeni:>er 9, 1930, Byrnes MSS. Arthur Krock, 
''New Deal Issue in Old Deal State." New York Tim~, August 25, 1936. 
13Baltimore Sun, June 25, 1936. Greenville NeJAJ.6, June 28, 1936. Columbia 
State, June 13, 22-30, July 4-10, 1936. Charlotte Ob¢e~ve~, July 1-8, 1936. 
"Byrnes Press Release" July 19 36, Byrnes MSS. 
14 Byrnes to B. M. Baruch, June 4, 1936, to W. P. Law, July 3, 1936, to 
A. F. Lever, August 3, 1936. A. F. Lever to Byrnes, June 28, 1936. Byrnes MSS. 
15coluni:>ia State, July 7-8, 1936. Yorkville EnquJ.Ae~, July 9, 1936. 
Greenville NeJAJ.6, July 10-12, 1936. "Byrnes Charleston Speech," no date, 1936. 
Byrnes MSS. Frank Jordan, The PJumaJUj Sta.-te (Columbia, 1967), pp. 73-74, 
16Leslie H. Fischel, "The Negro in the New Deal Era." The W~eon.6in Maga-
zine 06 H~.to!Uj XLVIII (Winter 1964-65): 111-123. For South Carolina reaction 
to the national trends after 1936, see Jack I. Hayes, "South Carolina and the 
New Deal, 1932-1938." (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1973), 
pp. 499-505. 
17CR, 75th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 3017-24, 7888-90, 7942-47, Appendix, 
pp. 1675-77. A. G. Kennedy to Byrnes, June 5, 1937, Byrnes to Q. E. Britt, 
December 18, 1937, to no addressee, August 8, 1937, to William Hall, December 
13, 1938, Byrnes MSS. Byrnes, Li6e.t<.me, pp. 85-87. 
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Alexander, Oral History Project, Colmnbia University, pp. 606-09. 
19CR, 74th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 6534-46. 
March 23, 1936, to Wingate Waring, April 23, 1936. 
20cR, 75th Congress, 3rd Session, pp. 305-311. 
21Ibid. 
Byrnes to K. G. Finley, 
Byrnes MSS. 
22 r· Ibid. New York ,U11e.6, January 7, 12, February 1, 1938. 
23For a discussion of the problems of "black Carolinians," see Idus A. 
Newby, B.tac.h. Ca.,wUni.aw,, A H.u..to}LJJ 06 B.tac./u, .ln South Ca.,wUna. 6Mm 1895 .to 
1968 (Colunbia, 1973). 
24 Ralph McGill, The South and the SouthVt.nVt.. (Boston, 1959), pp. 220-221. 
Cole L. Blease and the Senatorial Campaign of 1924 
by 
Daniel W. Hollis 
In 1918 Coleman Livingston Blease, the storm center of South Carolina 
politics since 1910, suffered his most humiliating defeat in a public career 
that spanned half a century. In the gubernatorial campaign of 1916 Blease had 
astounded his opponents by holding a commanding lead in the first Democratic 
primary, and had lost the election to Richard I. Manning by less than 5,000 
votes. Blease was stronger than ever in up country counties such as Aiken, 
Anderson, Cherokee, Oconee, Pickens, Spartanburg, and York, and the former 
governor also received good support in Charleston, Clarendon, Richland, Lee, 
Horry, and other counties in the low country.1 Furthermore, the founding of 
the Charleston AmeJt,[c.an by John P. Grace brought the much-needed support of a 
daily newspaper.2 Confident of success, Blease's "Reform Democrats" met in 
Columbia in October 1916 to make plans for the next campaign.3 
War with Germany however, ruined these bright prospects. In the late 
summer of 1917 Blease made a series of speeches in which he denounced United 
States entry into World War I. At Pomaria, in his old home county of Newberry, 
he asserted that the blood of American soldiers killed on foreign soil would 
be on the hands of members of Congress and the President. "I had rather be an 
outcast in the eyes of Woodrow Wilson and a follower of Jesus Christ," he said, 
"than to be a follower of Woodrow Wilson and an outcast from Jesus Christ . .,4 
A few days later he repeated these remarks at Filbert, in York County, and 
during the IIX)nth of August made similar speeches at Anderson and Pickens.5 
Although Blease made no IIX)re anti-war speeches after September, 1917, and 
announced that he was lending full support to the war effort, the damage had 
been done. In the senatorial campaign of 1918 he was denounced as a traitor 
by the press, the pulpit, the patriots, and the President. Although the death 
of Senator Tillman eliminated his IIX)St formidable opponent, Blease met defeat 
at the hands of Nathaniel B. Dial, a political unknown. The veteran campaign-
er received a majority vote in only four of the 45 counties, and the campaign 
was a disaster for Bleasite candidates for state and local office.6 
The Yo~kv-i11.e Enqui.~Vt., a key Blease newspaper since 1912, did not support 
him in 1918. "They got Mr. Blease this time," said Editor David Grist, "and 
in our judgement it was largely Mr. Blease's own fault."7 The editor was 
correct in saying that Blease had brought defeat upon himself, but he was mis-
taken in predicting that the former governor would no longer play a significant 
role in South Carolina politics. 
53 
The Sou th Carolina Historical Association 54 
Nevertheless, the 1918 campaign marked a turning point in the career of 
Cole L, Blease. In the words of a veteran anti-Blease editor, he was "tempered 
and chastened" by the bitterness of the assault launched against him.8 Never 
again would the political warhorse resort to the abusive style and scathing 
rhetoric that featured his political campaigns from 1910 to 1918. Henceforth 
Bleaseism would be of a muc}:i milder variety. Furthermore, the "Reform Demo-
crats" were never reorganized; no longer would aspiring young politicians such 
as Sam Nichols, Claud N. Sapp, Olin Sawyer, George Bell Timmerman, and C. C. 
Wyche join the Blease movement in order to advance their political careers. 
Although events in 1918 had brought his political fortunes to a low ebb, 
Blease took two steps in the following year that caused further deterioration 
of his strength. On February 9, 1919, at ceremonies honoring the late Theodore 
Roosevelt held at Sidney Park African Methodist Episcopal Church in Columbia, 
Blease addressed an audience of about 5,000 blacks, including soldiers in the 
process of being discharged from service at Camp Jackson. Introduced by a 
Negro minister as a governor whose efforts in behalf of blacks in the peneten-
tiary made him one of the best friends the Negro ever had, Blease praised 
Roosevelt as "the greatest American this country has yet produced," and as a 
chief executive who would have provided much better leadership in the war than 
had Woodrow Wilson. Furthermore, he declared that the domestic achievements of 
the Wilson administration were "largely a duplication" of Roosevelt's program. 
The former governor went on to advise the blacks to "stand by their leaders" 
and reaffirmed his friendship with Bishop W. D. Chappelle of the A.M.E. Church.9 
These remarks, which were similar to those he made in a speech at Allen 
University in October 1916, contrasted sharply with the anti-Negro diatribes 
which had become his stock in trade.10 The Sidney Park Church speech also came 
at a time when racial tensions were increasing in the aftermath of World War I. 
At the same time that Blease advised blacks to stand by their leaders, Bishop 
Chappelle and other Negro leaders were demanding the vote, more freedom, and a 
better deal in general for members of their race.11 "The war was fought for 
Democracy," said Chappelle in an address delivered later in February. "We want 
Democracy in our own country. 11 12 
Apparently the speech at Sidney Park Church dumbfounded both friend and 
foe. The pro-Blease Charleston AmeJu.ean and Newberry He~o.ld and New~ made no 
mention of this newsworthy event, and while the Voll.kv-<.J.l.e EnqLUJte~ did publish 
an account, it refrained from editorial comment. Although the anti-Blease 
Columbia S.ta.te and Charleston New6 and CouJu.~ did carry an account of the 
speech, both also refrained from editorial comment, and most of the press ig-
nored the speech.13 
In July 1919 Representative Asbury F. Lever of the Seventh Congressional 
District of South Carolina resigned in order to accept a position with the 
federal department of agriculture. When a special election was ordered for the 
unexpired term Blease announced that he would seek the post as an independent 
candidate in the general election rather than in the Democratic primary. In a 
blistering statement reminiscent of an earlier day, the former governor assert-
ed that he had been robbed of victory in the Democratic primaries of 1914 and 
1916 and that he could not hope to receive fair treatment from officials of 
the Democratic Party. Assailing Richard I. Manning and other old foes and 
reverting to his customary Negrophobia, Blease stated that he had no apologies 
to make for his criticism of Woodrow Wilson and his opposition to the war and 
to the League of Nations. He also announced that he was against the prohibi-
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tion and woman suffrage amendments to the federal constitution.14 
Although Blease advised his supporters to refrain from voting in the Dem::,-
cratic primary in order to be eligible to vote for him in the general election, 
it was widely assumed that his only chance as an independent candidate would 
depend upon a large turnout of blacks. "Independantism," said the Newberry 
He.lW.i.d and NeJAJ6, "means an appeal to the Negro vote" and the editor pointed out 
that Blease had been am:Jng the first to maintain that bolting the party was an 
unpardonable sin in South Carolina.15 Meanwhile, the six candidates who enter-
ed the Dem:Jcratic primary joined in praising Woodrow Wilson and in denouncing 
Blease. 16 
If Blease intended to rally the blacks to his support, his candidacy came 
at a most inopportune time. Race relations in the state and nation in the 
summer of 1919 were worse than at anytime since the 1890's.17 A riot in 
Charleton in May had resulted in three deaths, and the same South Carolina news-
papers that informed readers of developments in the special Congressional 
election were filled with accounts of racial disturbances in Washington, Chica-
go, and Knoxville. 18 In Newberry a Negro war veteran arrested on charges of 
insulting a white girl narrowly escaped lynching when it was discovered that 
he had pictures of a white woman in his possession. There were rumors that 
Bishop Chappelle was advising blacks to arm themselves, and a biracial commit-
tee was created in Columbia to ease racial tensions.19 Late in August Repre-
sentative James F. Byrnes, alarmed by the race riots and angered by the demands 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in behalf of 
Negro veterans, made a speech in Congress in which he bluntly informed the 
blacks that the war had in no way changed the racial attitude of whites. 
Byrnes advised Negro veterans who could not live in the United States without 
political and social equality to depart for Africa or any other country they 
wished. 20 South Carolina chapters of the newly-formed American Legion took 
steps to exclude black veterans from membership.21 
In mid-August Blease abruptly withdrew from the campaign. As in the case 
of his resignation from the governorship in 1915, he gave no satisfactory 
explanation for his action. His statement that he had never really intended to 
make the race, and that he had a reason for doing what he had done but did not 
wish to reveal it, satisfied nobody.22 He probably underestimated the extent 
of the opposition to his independent candidacy. "I am not surprised," said 
Senator N. B. Dial, "that a man who was disloyal in 1918 would bolt the party 
and encourage Negroes to vote. 11 23 In any event, his withdrawal was a saga-
cious m::,ve. Even under normal circum'itances he would have had difficulty in 
winning. Although he could count on good support in Lexington and Richland 
counties, the seventh district also included Orangeburg and Sumter, which were 
anti-Blease strongholds. In the atm::,sphere of 1919 he stood little or no 
chance as an independent candidate. 
In addition to this fiasco, Blease sustained other reversals in 1919. On 
July 4 Sheriff Hendrix Rector, the main cog in the Blease machine in Greenville 
County, was shot and killed by Jake Gosnell, an old antagonist from bootlegging 
days in Greenville's "Dark Corner." 24 Furthermore, ill heal th caused the 
retirement of Sheriff Joe H. M. Ashley, who lead the Blease forces in Anderson, 
his strongest county. 25 
Following his debacle in the Congressional election, Blease was politi-
cally inactive for more than a year. Meanwhile, he continued his law practice 
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in Columbia, which during those years yielded an annual income of more than 
$5,000 a year, a handsome sum at the time.26 This practice, chiefly criminal, 
kept him in the public eye and took him into courthouses all over South 
Carolina enabling him to maintain his association with jurors, sheriffs, and 
other county officials who formed an important core of support.27 He was also 
active in several fraternal orders, serving as a national officer in organiza-
tions such as the Red Men, Odd Fellows, Elks, and Knights of Pythias. In 1921, 
a newspaper correspondent stated that his hair was grayer than it had been when 
he was governor, but he was still wearing the beaver hats, red neck ties, and 
fine suits of clothes that made him a striking figure.28 
Nineteen-twenty was the most peaceful election year in South Carolina 
since 1904; for the first time since 1888 Cole L. Blease was not a candidate 
for public office. Governor Cooper was unopposed for reelection, and Senator 
Ellison D. Smith, who had defeated Blease in 1914, was easily reelected. When 
Blease issued a statement mildly endorsing Smith, the senator's opponent charged 
that an "evil combination" had been formed that would revive the bitter faction-
alism of an earlier day. Actually, Blease took no active part in the campaign 
and did not even vote in the Democratic primary.29 He endorsed Smith because 
he thought he was the best candidate.30 
In September 1919 Thomas F. McDow, a prominent lawyer who had led the 
anti-Blease forces in York County for several years, wrote W.W. Ball, editor 
of the State, the leading anti-Blease journal in South Carolina, that so far 
as he could ascertain, Bleaseism was dead. The attorney expressed the hope 
that the "thoughtful and intelligent" people of the state could now proceed 
with progressive legislation.31 Aioong the programs desired by men such as Ball, 
McDow, G. Croft Williams, secretary of the State Board of Charities and Correc-
tions, and Governor Robert A. Cooper, were effective school attendance laws, 
better support of state colleges, good roads, reform in the administration of 
criminal justice, better assessment of property for taxation, and the strength-
ening of the Board of Charities and Corrections, South Carolina's pioneer 
public welfare agency. These men were also ardent supporters of Woodrow Wil-
son. 32 
Bleaseism, however, was only slumbering, and events were taking place that 
would help bring about its revival. In the Byzantine world of Charleston 
politics, the John P. Grace faction regained control of the city government in 
1919. The Blease-Grace alliance is a prime example of the old adage that 
politics makes strange bedfellows. An active Roman Catholic, proud of his 
Irish ancestry, the mayor of Charleston was an urban reformer in touch with 
Progressive leaders throughout the nation. He favored good roads, woman suff-
rage, opposed restriction of immigration, and was ioore friendly to the Negro 
than any public official in South Carolina. Nevertheless, he made connnon 
cause with Blease in opposing American entry into the war, President Wilson, 
the League of Nations, prohibition, and the administrations of governors 
Manning and Cooper.33 
Developments on the economic front also improved the climate for Blease. 
The prosperity that had accompanied the war continued through 1919, which, with 
cotton selling for thirty-five cents a pound, was the roost prosperous year in 
the history of South Carolina agriculture.34 The textile industry, operating 
at peak capacity, paid good wages and high dividends. But in 1920 the roof 
caved in; cotton selling for forty-one cents a pound in June, declined to 
fifteen cents in December, and to eleven cents in March 1921.35 The disastrous 
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slump in cotton prices was followed by the arrival of the boll weevil, which 
swept through the state in 1921. South Carolina cotton farmers never recovered 
fully from the blows they received in 1920-1921. On the industrial front the 
textile industry suffered less damage, but many of the cotton mills were forced 
to curtail operations, wages were cut, and dividends declined.36 
In January 1921 spokesmen at a taxpayer's convention in York demanded 
sharp reductions in the expenditures of the state government. Various speakers 
assailed the highway commission, appropriations for hi~her education, and the 
work of school attendance officers, whose duty was "to gather up a few kinky 
headed niggers (sic) and put them in school, instead of putting them in the 
cotton patch where they belonged." Later in the year delegates to a state con-
vention in Coluni>ia attacked the highway commission, the state board of health, 
and the tax commission.37 
In 1920 the Wilsonian tide continued to run strongly in South Carolina, 
with Governor Cooper, the legislature, and Democratic Party officials issuing 
statements and resolutions praising the President.38 In Saluda, however, when 
the county Democratic convention adopted resolutions supporting Wilson and the 
League, former senator George Wightman, the unsuccessful Blease candidate for 
secretary of state in 1916 and lieutenant governor in 1918, made an impassioned 
speech in opposition. In the August primary Saluda County returned Wightman to 
the state senate, where for the next four years "Battle Ax" George waged war 
upon the appropriations for every state agency. 39 Bleaseism was reviving. 
In Noveni>er 1920 the Republicans won a resounding victory in the national 
elections, although South Carolina stood loyally by the Democratic ticket of 
Cox and Roosevelt. Blease, whose personal antagonism to Woodrow Wilson dated 
from 1912, was pleased with the results. He did not vote in the state Demo-
cratic primary in August because to do so would bind him to vote the Democratic 
ticket in the general election, and he did not wish to vote for a presidential 
candidate pledged to support the League of Nations.40 Therefore, if he voted 
in the general election he voted for Harding. As he said later, "I am a Demo-
crat; not a Wilson so-called Democrat but a Jeffersonian Democrat who rejoiced 
at Harding's election and the downfall of Idealism, which gave us nothing but 
fresh-made graves, widows, orphans, and billions of dollars taxes ••.. 1141 
Shortly after the Republican landslide Blease delivered his first public 
address in almost two years at Manning, the county-seat of Clarendon, a low 
country county in which he had strong support. The former governor said that 
North, East, and West had repudiated Woodrow Wilson, and that it was time for 
the South to do so. The election results, he said, were a vindication of his 
stand in 1918. Blease asserted that men of his viewpoint had been denied free-
dom of speech in South Carolina, "where the nigger (sic) bugaboo is forever 
held up to frighten our people into submission to any kind of rot called Demo-
cratic.1142 
Blease's denunciation of President Wilson, his attacks upon officials of 
the state Dern::Jcratic Party, his pro-Negro speeches, and his pleasure at Hard-
ing's election led to speculation that he was going to lead a new Republican 
faction in South Carolina. His friendship with Joseph R. Tolbert, the Republi-
can leader who dispensed patronage in South Carolina, led to rumors that he 
would accept an appointment as United States attorney.43 
If Blease did contemplate such a move, he soon abandoned the idea, and in 
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the summer of 1921 he ended his flirtation with the Republicans. In late July 
and in August, almost exactly four years after his famous anti-war speeches, 
he returned to Filbert and to Jolly Street, a hamlet near Pomaria in Newberry 
County, and asserted that his predictions about the war had come true. In 
these addresses he also attacked the increased expenditures of the state 
government, and he singled out the highway commission, the Board of Charities 
and Corrections, and other new agencies created by the Manning administration, 
for attack. The employees of these departments, he said, did nothing but 
drink Coca Cola and ride around Columbia in automobiles. He also called upon 
the cotton mills to pay higher wages instead of spending money on social wel-
fare programs.44 The former governor stated that he was beseiged with requests 
to return to politics4 and in November he announced his intention of running 
for governor in 1922. 5 
During the next several months Blease was busily engaged in lining up 
support for his sixth campaign for the governorship. During the legislative 
session of 1922 he appeared in the Statehouse for the first time since he left 
the governor's office in 1915. His formal announcement came late in March, 
when he stated that he would be a candidate in the Democratic primary and would 
abide by the rules of the executive committee of the state party. Conveniently 
forgetting his campaign tactics from 1910 to 1918, Blease stated that "I have 
never yet nor will I ever attempt to arraign class against class .... 11 46 He 
also announced that there would be no Blease ticket, although he hoped for the 
election of legislators who supported his platform, which was economy in 
government. He promised to cut taxes and reduce expenditures by abolishing the 
new state agencies. The canny veteran acknowledged that he had opposed woman 
suffrage, but he urged all white women to register to vote and also advised 
them to keep a "well oiled pistol" handy in case of emergency. 4 7 
Blease's most formidable opponent in 1922 was former lieutenant governor 
Thomas G. McLeod of Bishopville, who advocated continuation of the social pro-
grams sponsored by Manning and Cooper. Another strong candidate was State 
Senator George K. Laney of Chesterfield, who also defended the state agencies 
that he had helped to create. Better ~chools and good roads cost money, said 
Laney, who contended that little tax reduction would result from abolishing 
the tax commission and other beneficial departments of the state government.48 
Three other candidates had little support. 
When the campaign opened in June, Blease continued his attack upon the 
new state agencies, lazy state employees, and increased appropriations for 
institutions of higher learning. "Many a man comes out of college," he said, 
"with a sheep skin in his pocket and a sheep head on his shoulders." The tax 
commission was referred to as the "smelling commission," and he asserted that 
"Dr. Manning and Dr. Cooper had given the state the worst case of bellyache it 
ever had. 1149 
Nevertheless, the former governor did not resort to the offensive remarks 
and abusive personal attacks that had featured his campaigns in the previous 
decade. He made only occasional references to his opponents, while McLeod 
and Laney refrained from attacking him. Although the Columbia Reco~d main-
tained that the "new Blease" was the "same old Blease" with better manners, he 
was careful to do nothing that would revive the antagonism of the anti-
Bleasei tes. 50 
The results of the first primary in late August revealed that Blease had 
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regained his old strength. With 77,800 votes, the veteran campaigner held a 
lead of about 12,000 votes over McLeod. Laney was third with 23,200 and the 
other three candidates received a total of less than 10,000 votes.51 
The opposition, led by the S~e, rallied behind McLeod. Large advertise-
ments in the newspapers by the "Democrats of '76" reminded the voters of the 
speech by Elease at Allen University where he had told the Negroes to demand 
their rights, of his "bitter abuse" of Woodrow Wilson, of his candidacy for 
Congress as an independent, and of his flirtation with the Republicans. The 
"De100crats of '76" called upon the "heirs of Hampton and Tillman" to defeat 
him.52 
Events of 1916 were repeated. Again Elease, on the threshold of victory 
in the first primary, was unable to gain enough support to win the second. 
McLeod was victorious by a vote of 100,100 to 85,800.53 The ~a.l!kv-<.Lte EnqU,Ute~ 
complained that "the oligarchy, led by the Columbian S~e , remains in control 
of the situation," but Elease had learned to live with defeat. He issued 
bland statements expressing regret that he could not serve the oppressed tax-
payers and indicating that he would again be available in 1924. There were 
no charges of collusion and fraud and no bitter attacks upon officials of the 
De100cratic Party.54 
Although Elease was confronted with serious problems of a personal nature 
in the fall of 1922 and in 1923, they did not prevent him from making plans for 
the next campaign.55 The unexpected defeat of John P. Grace in the Charleston 
city elections in 1923 weakened his support there, but he could still count on 
the Grace faction to deliver a good vote.56 In 1924 he made his third attempt 
to obtain a seat in the United States Senate. 
Senator Nathaniel B. Dial had been unable to live down the term "political 
accident" that had followed him since 1918, when he had been the beneficiary 
of the death of Tillman and the vulnerability of Elease. A resourceful busi-
nessman whose enterprises included banks, cotton mills, power companies, and 
a glass factory, Dial expounded a conservatism that had won the support of the 
financial community but had not endeared him to farmers and textile workers 
that comprised the bulk of the electorate. Dial was a poor speaker and had 
developed little talent for political organization.57 Nevertheless, as the 
incumbent, he would be an important contender. 
A more formidable candidate was James F. Byrnes of Aiken, who had repre-
sented the third Congressional district since 1911. Ambitious to serve in the 
upper house, Byrnes had an attractive personality, was a good speaker, and a 
talented politician.SB John H. McMahan of Columbia, former state superinten-
dent of education, insurance coDDnissioner, and legislator, had little support, 
but he was destined to play a key role in the campaign. 
Inasmuch as the 1922 campaign had revealed that Elease had recaptured his 
following and would probably receive forty percent or roore of the vote, the 
problem confronting Dial and Byrnes in the first primary was survival. There-
fore, when the county-to-county campaign began in June Byrnes ignored Elease 
and attacked Dial as an ineffective senator. Dial made heated replies, and 
the two men had an angry confrontation at Florence. After this episode Byrnes 
ceased his attacks, but McMahan, who had been much more caustic, directed in-
cessant attacks at the incumbent, accusing him of nepotism, of using the office 
for private gain, and of voting with the Coolidge Republicans. The angry sena-
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tor charged that McMahan was a stalking horse for Byrnes, and after nearly 
coming to blows at Greenwood, Dial and McMahan engaged in a fight at Gaffney.59 
Meanwhile, Blease remained calm and dignified throughout the campaign. 
The former stormy petrel engaged in the role of peacemaker at Florence and 
Greenwood and of referee at Gaffney. The candidate who had once described 
opponents and hecklers as "nigger lovers," "belly crawlers," "snakes," "liars," 
and "cowards," and referred to Negroes as "baboons and apes," waged his 1924 
campaign on the brotherhood of man, the fatherhood of God, and the diety of 
Jesus Christ. He advocated the use of family prayers as a means of avoiding 
war. At Winnsboro he waved the Confederate flag, praised southern womanhood, 
and stood by states rights. He refused to reply to McMahan's charges that as 
governor he had befriended Dispensary grafters, sold pardons, and condoned 
lynching, and that he had been disloyal during the war.60 Although his new 
style was praised in most quarters, it caused one old Bleasite to wonder 
''What's this here world a-coming to? 116l 
The clash of personalities obscured the irrelevance of the campaign to the 
serious problems confronting the state in 1924. The agricultural depression 
that had begun in 1920 was having a ruinous effect upon the South Carolina 
economy.62 Furthermore, many of the textile mills were operating only three 
or four days a week, and there were 116 bank failures during the years 1921-
1925.63 The great migration that caused a decline of 204,000 in South Carolina 
black population during the decade was causing profound economic and social 
changes.64 Yet none of the candidates presented an intelligent analysis of 
these developments. 
As of 1924 the age of segregation was at its peak, and with all of the 
candidates supporting white supremacy, race did not become a dominant issue. 
Yet the Negro question was always present in a South Carolina political cam-
paign. Byrnes, who had strong support from the increasingly potent American 
Legion, criticized Dial for opposing payment of a bonus to veterans of the war. 
The senator had voted against the bonus on the grotmds that unwotmded service-
men did not need it, and that it was too costly to the taxpayers, but during 
the campaign he shifted his opposition to racial grounds. According to Dial, 
Negroes would receive $24,000,000 of the $49,000,000 that would be paid to 
Palmetto veterans. Meanwhile, South Carolinians would have to pay $35,000,000 
in taxes to the federal government to finance the measure, a burden that would 
fall upon the whites. Consequently, the senator viewed the bonus as an overall 
loss to South Carolina.65 
Although Byrnes did not go so far as to oppose payment of the bonus to 
black veterans, his racial views were the same as in 1919.66 In joining other 
candidates in favoring restrictive immigration laws Byrnes asserted that "I'd 
rather have one big black nigger (sic) on my cotton farm than a half dozen 
Italians. 1167 Blease said little or nothing about the Negro. 
In 1924 the Ku Klux Klan was at the peak of its activity in the United 
States. Although not as strong in South Carolina as in neighboring states, the 
imperial order was making its presence felt.68 There were Klan parades in 
Columbia, Easley, Lake City, and other towns, a Klan ftmeral in Columbia, a 
Klan wedding in Blackville, and robed Klansmen frequently appeared at church 
services throughout the state.69 According to one knowledgeable observer, 
thirty-five members of the General Assembly belonged to the Klan, and the 
Palmetto delegation to the national Democratic Party convention, which took 
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place in New York during the campaign, voted solidly against the effort made by 
some delegates to censure the Klan.70 John W. Davis, the Democratic nominee 
for President, denounced the organization} but the South Carolina senatorial 
candidates maintained a discreet silence. 1 
In the first primary on August 26, Blease, with 83,700 votes, representing 
about 42 percent of the total, held a lead of about 16,000 votes over Byrnes, 
Dial was third with 44,400, and HcMahan received only minor support.72 Byrnes' 
strategy appeared to be working. Having eliminated Dial, he could launch a 
campaign to rally the anti-Blease forces in the second primary. He engaged 
Asbury F. Lever, an old antagonist of the former governor, as his manager and 
stepped up his already extensive advertising campaign. 
Byrnes, as had Dial, had avoided criticizing Blease in the first primary, 
but he began a series of attacks upon the former governor. One advertisement, 
signed by Colonel J. Monroe Johnson, a prominent veteran of the war, called 
attention to Byrnes' close association with President Wilson and raised the 
question of Blease's loyalty in 1917. Another, signed by Lever, asserted that 
the issue was Blease, the "biennial candidate." The "Democrats of '76" remind-
ed the voters of the issues they had raised in the 1922 campaign, and the 
Byrnes camp also made extensive use of advertisements in which the Aiken Mini-
sterial Association and the officers of St. Thaddeus Protestant Episcopal 
Church praised Byrnes for his fine Christian character and for the active role 
he and Hrs. Byrnes had taken in church affairs.73 
Meanwhile, Blease remained silent in the face of this onslaught. He had 
used no newspaper advertisements in the first primary, and in one of the few 
political notices he released in the second he asserted that he had engaged in 
no attacks upon his opponents and that he had not hired a manager to launch an 
abusive advertising campaign. 74 
The contest was so close that its outcome could be determined by last-
minute developments. On September 6, three days before the second primary on 
September 9, an inconspicious advertisement appeared on page six of the Cha.l!i.e-6-
.t.on Evening Po6t. 'lwenty men who described themselves as schoolmates of James 
F. Byrnes at St. Patrick's Roman Catholic School, who had served as altar boys 
with him at St. Patrick's Church, annou.'\ced that they were supporting Byrnes 
because of his faith in Christian ideals. They also stated that they rejoiced 
in his success in life because it demonstrated that "a man can rise from the 
lowest to the loftiest state in spite of race, class or creed prejudice. 11 75 
The wording of this notice was much like that of the endorsements Byrnes had 
received from the Aiken ministers and from officers of St. Thaddeus Episcopal 
Church. 
The "endorsement" was the work of John P. Grace and was intended to remind 
the Grace faction that Byrnes had forsaken his Irish ancestors and had deserted 
the Roman Catholic Church. 76 The. Po6t had little circulation out of Charleston, 
but a Blease campaign worker printed the advertisement as a broadside and 
runners distributed 12,000 copies in the up COI.Dltry, where it served to inform 
Piedm::>nt Protestants that Byrnes had once been a member of the Catholic 
Church. 77 Mayor Thomas P. Stoney, who managed the Byrnes campaign in Charles-
ton, hastened to denounce the "Eleventh Hour Attack on Byrnes." The men who 
signed the advertisement said Stoney, were am::>ng the most rabid Grace partisans 
in Charleston, and the distribution of the circular made a mockery of Blease's 
pretense of conducting a high-level campaign. 78 
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'nle Cuban Revolution in Historical Perspective 
by 
Neill Macaulay 
Last fall at the University of Florida a student came up to me--a good, 
solid "B" s tudent--with a question about my assigned readings. He said that in 
several places the name "Che" Guevara was mentioned. Who was this guy "Che" 
Guevara? It was then that it dawned on me--not only that I was getting old--
but that Che had been dead for ten years, that Fidel Castro had been in power 
for nearly twenty years, that the Cuban Revolution was actually history. The 
Cuban Revolution had passed the essential generational boundary. People were 
reading adulthood who had no personal recollection of the late 1950's and 
early 1960's--the years of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary struggle in 
Cuba. 'nle passions of those years, of course, linger on--in the hearts of 
middle-aged men and women--and there is the recurring image of Fidel Castro, on 
our television screens, little changed in 20 years, which can cause us to con-
fuse past with present. But the rise to power of Fidel Castro and the estab-
lishment of a totalitarian socialist regime in Cuba belong to the past; they 
are historical facts. We now have the perspective to fit them into the flow 
of history--to relate them to what went before, and what has happened since. 
'nle historian who undertakes such a task will certainly run into people--
perhaps even some of his own colleagues--who will insist that the Cuban Revolu-
tion went against the flow of history, that it was an aberration. This view 
is expressed in roost of the existing literature in English on the Cuban Revolu-
tion, which was written by, or heavily influenced by, those whom the Revolution 
swept aside. 'nley see themselves not as the victims of history, but as the 
victims of a small group of conspirators who were able to divert history. 
Basically there are two conspiracy theories about the Cuban Revolution. 
One regards the overthrow of the Batista government and the rebel seizure of 
power in 1959 as the result of an international communist plot, efficiently 
coordinated and carried out by subversives in Cuba and the United States. 'nle 
Revolution was, to quote the title of one book, A VaggVL in the Hea!Lt--placed 
there, according to plan, by ruthless, dedicated communists with the help of 
politicians and journalists whose greed and ani>ition made them easy dupes of 
the conspirators. This is a theory that has been especially popular with 
followers of former Dictator Fulgencio Batista, with Cubans who arrived in the 
United States in 1959, not long after Fidel Castro came to power.1 
'nle other conspiracy theory, which has been much more influential in 
government and academic circles in the United States, was popularized by the 
69 
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refugees of the early 1960's, those who fled Cuba after a year or more of rule 
by Fidel Castro. These included doctors, lawyers, educators, newspaper pub-
lishers, progressive businessmen and liberal politicians. They were primarily 
middle class and many had actively or passively opposed the Batista dictator-
ship. The revolution they had supported was a popular, democratic one, which 
had as its principal objective the restoration of political freedom in Cuba. 
This, they claimed, was the true Cuban Revolution, which had the overwhelming 
support of the Cuban people. After the Cuban people had brought down the 
dictatorship, by popular resistance and underground activity, and as they were 
celebrating their victory, Fidel Castro and a handful of guerrillas supposedly 
descended from the mountains and seized power. The rural guerrilla leader was 
at first accepted by the urban, middle-class revolutionaries because he seemed 
to share their ideals of political freedom. Then, when Fidel Castro began to 
"betray" their revolution, Cuban liberals withdrew to the United States, where 
they sought the help of the government in redeeming "their revolution." They 
convinced the Kennedy administration that Fidel Castro and his bearded guer-
rillas were actually a small group of conspirators, without significant mili-
tary experience or capacity, and without mass support, who had betrayed a 
popular revolution.2 
So there you have your choice of conspiracy theories: the Revolution was 
from the very beginning a conspiracy against the Cuban people, or it started 
out as a genuinely popular movement, but was usurped--taken over in a period 
of confusion and betrayed--by a gang of conspirators. In either case, the 
present regime in Cuba would be one founded on deception and sustained by 
coercion. The events of the past two decades cast considerable doubt on such 
an interpretation. For a regime supposedly based on the shaky grounds of con-
spiracy, the Cuban Revolution had displayed astounding strength, Revolutionary 
Cuba did not just defeat a United States backed emigre invasion; it utterly 
destroyed the forces of the counterrevolution in a matter of hours in April 
1961, The Revolutionary government went on to survive the humiliation of the 
Soviet missile pull-out in October 1962, as well as a U.S. and Latin America 
trade embargo and various U, S.-instigated assassination attempts against its 
Maximum Leader. The government of Fidel Castro has overcome the consequences 
of its own economic mismanagement, and the disasterous results of its efforts 
to export communist revolution to other Latin American countries in the later 
1960's. It has gone on to rack up impressive victories on the battle fields 
of Africa and on the playing fields of the Olympics. In the final standings 
of the 1976 summer Olympics, Cuba, with a population of less than ten million, 
was number eight among the nations of the world. 
If recent Cuban history is not determined by Fidel Castro--and I am not 
suggesting that it is--it is certainly reflected in his career. Today the 
Cuban Revolution's Maximum Leader is number six in seniority among the world's 
current dictators. His time in power is exceeded only by that of Tito of Yugo-
slavia, Hoxha of Albania, Kim II-Sung of North Korea, Stroessner of Paraguay, 
and Kadar of Hungary. He has already ruled Cuba seven years longer than Hit-
ler ruled Germany, four years longer than Napoleon ruled France. He has shown 
no propensity for making the kind of mistakes that have destroyed other "great 
men," His survival instincts are clearly superior to those of some of the 
world's recent big-power leaders, like Nikita Khruschev, John and Robert 
Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, all of whom at one time or another 
had unpleasant dealings with Fidel. It was probably John Kennedy who tried 
hardest to eliminate the Maximum Leader. He failed so abysmally at the Bay 
of Pigs that, to recover lost prestige, he connnitted the United States to 
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flying to the rroon and to smashing the communists in Indochina. Kennedy was 
not a bad historian, but his policies toward Indochina and Cuba went against 
the flow of history. Fidel Castro has a better sense of history--which is to 
say he has a feeling for the possible, which includes a good perception of the 
limitations on his own actions as a national and world leader. He has pretty 
well derronstrated that, given enough rope, he will hang an adversary--not him-
self. Unlike many of his adversaries, he has not been prone to wishful 
thinking. He is quick to realize when he has made a mistake, which makes 
recovery easier. He is intuitive, but his actions are governed primarily by 
reason, not errotion. He is no Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon. 
Recent history helps us evaluate Fidel Castro as a leader. The rrore 
distant past can also be useful. It might be instructive to compare Fidel 
Castro with our top American Revolutionary, George Washington. There WeJte 
some interesting similarities in their personalities and careers, although 
George Washington and Fidel Castro were also quite different in some important 
ways. For one thing, Washington was never a dictator, nor did he aspire to 
be one. George Washington accepted subordination to the Continental Congress 
during the Revolutionary War, and he ruled within the limits of the Constitu-
tion when he was president. Also, Washington, unlike Fidel, had no interest 
in exporting his country's revolution. 
Nevertheless, there are some striking similarities--beginning with their 
physical reserrolance. Shave off Fidel's beard and give him a white wig and he 
would make a perfect George Washington for some cognac advertisement. Both men 
were much taller than average, well built, strong, very impressive physically. 
They were both well-to-do country boys who loved the out-of-doors. They were 
hunters and good marksmen. Both were noted for their strong will, determina-
tion, and exceptional stamina. Both were willing and able to endure years of 
great hardship to achieve their goals. They were resourceful and imaginative--
but also realistic. Both realized that a great undertaking is not easily 
accomplished; they pushed on while others fell by the wayside. In war, they 
both were patient, methodical, cautious, but tricky. Either was capable of 
launching a sneak attack on a religious holiday. Neither Washington nor Fidel, 
however, excelled in normal offensive operations. They won by surviving; by 
keeping their forces in tact, by outlasting the enemy, by wearing him down, by 
undermining the enemy's base of support among the people. 
In politics both underwent some ideological transformation. George 
Washington began his revolutionary career as a constitutional ioonarchist, while 
Fidel Castro started out as a constitutional derrocrat. Both would eventually 
espouse the rrost radical form of government then in existence. Each fought for 
the independence of his country. Each confronted the world's most powerful 
nation, and each, to maintain his country's independence, felt it necessary to 
make an alliance with the world's second most powerful nation. 
But Washington, after the Revolutionary War, worked hard to improve 
relations with Britain and to weasel out of the alliance with France. Whereas 
Fidel Gas tro had only recently shown an inclination to "normalize" relations 
with the United States, and, for the last ten years, he apparently has worked 
to tighten, not loosen, Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union. Fidel Castro sees 
Cuba as part of a world revolution, for which the Soviet Union is the most 
i mportant source of material support. George Washington, on the other hand, 
did not see the United States in any such role. When Rev~lutionary France held 
out the possibility of a partnership in world revolution, Washington wisely 
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ignored it. In this regard, Fidel's sense of history may prove to be inferior 
to Washington's. We should know in another twenty years. 
Putting aside until then questions of world revolution, let's consider 
just the Cuban Revolution. It is historically legitimate? Was it not, in fact, 
spurious, based on fraud? Or, if the Revolution was legitimate in its origins, 
didn't Fidel Castro betray it by imposing a communist regime on Cuba? 
It is certainly true that in 1959 and earlier Fidel Castro did profess 
devotion to the principles of liberal democracy. But this was not the Cuban 
Revolution. If the Cuban Revolution was betrayed, then so were the American 
and French Revolutions that in their early stages proclaimed loyalty to Kings. 
After organizing a government, it took Fidel Castro about as long to discard 
liberal democracy as it took the Second Continental Congress to disown the 
British monarchy. A revolution is not the statement of a program and its sub-
sequent enactment into law. It is not a "New Freedom," or a "New Deal," or a 
"New Frontier." It is true that in a revolution principles are enunciated and 
objectives are stated; but the principles as well as the objectives can, and 
do, change. A revolution has its own dynamics: it is both a force and a 
direction. The revolution is best defined by its leaders; and its leaders are 
those who correctly interpret the aspirations and capabilities of their people. 
The leader who betrays the Revolution soon loses his power and, often, his head 
as well. Fidel was probably right in 1961 when he declared that "to stop, to 
obstruct or constrain a revolutionary process would be tantamount to betraying 
it."3 
Actually, the politics of a constitutional democracy is not so different 
from that of a revolution--just slower and less violent. The democratic leader 
who clings to outmoded principles, who falls behind the march of events, is 
voted out of office. When a Franklin Roosevelt or a Jimmy Carter does exactly 
the opposite of what he had pledged to do, this can be called "good politics," 
or even "statesmanship." But when Fidel Castro does an about face, it's 
immoral. The English historian Hugh Thomas has noted that "Wes tern countries, 
recalling the experience of Lenin, have come to expect from revolutionary 
leaders a consistency and a ruthless integrity which they would not demand from 
more conventional leaders. 114 
But revolutionary leaders, no less than conventional leaders, are likely 
to try to retain the broadest following possible at any given point in the 
revolutionary or political process. Candor is seldom a prime ingredient of 
revolutionary proclamations. Consider John Dickinson's and Thomas Jefferson's 
"Declaration on the Causes of Taking up Arms," which sought to assure the 
American people in 1775 that the revolutionaries in Philadelphia "mean not to 
dissolve (the) union, .••• have not ra~sed armies with ambitious designs of 
separation from Great Britain. 11 4A One might even questior. the sincerity of 
General Washington's toasts to the King, which he made nip)l.tly at his officer's 
mess throughout the year 1775. Moderates must be kept in the revolutionary 
fold as long as possible--until they can be radicalized, or until they are no 
longer needed. 
In Cuba, "r.he" Guevara, whose role was like a combination of those played 
in the American Revolution by Lafayette, von Steuben, and Tom Paine, conceded 
the desirability of attracting middle-class support for the revolutionary 
cause. "Among students and professional people," Che w~ote, "abstract ideas 
such as liberty are found to be motives for the fight." Those who fought for 
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the Cuban Revolution believing that it would give them liberty were misled. 
The mral issue here is by no means clear cut. As Cardinal Newman has noted, 
"almst all authors, Catholic and Protestant, admit that when a. jUA,t, c.a.iu.e .v., 
pJUU,e.nt: there is some kind or other of verbal misleading which is not sin. 116 
Whether or not the Cuban Revolution was "just," it was legitimate. That 
is, it measures up to the standards of other revolutions. Its legitimacy was 
tested at every stage of its development. The Revolution's first phase, the 
guerrilla struggle, lasted two years. During that period Fidel Castro mobilized 
Cuba's rural masses, raised a large guerrilla force, fought government forces 
in the countryside, defeated them, and compelled the dictator to flee. A few 
days later the 6..i..deUAta.6 were in total control of Cli>a, despite attempts by 
rival, mostly urban revolutionary groups to make them share power. 
There was nothing spurious about the 1956-1958 guerrilla campaign, or the 
Cuban government's reaction to it. The fact is that Dictator Batista's troops 
performed very well on many occasions; they put down urban uprisings with great 
efficiency, and, when attacked in the countryside, they defended their positions 
with admirable tenacity. Seldom did a government unit surrender =less it was 
outgunned, completely surrounded, and without hope of reinforcement. Up to the 
very end, government garrisons fought off superior rebel forces in actions that 
can only be described as gallant. 7 We should remenber that Batista's army had 
practically no airlift capability, and a besieged tmit could be relieved only 
by a ground column fighting its way through the inevitable guerrilla ambushes. 
It .v., generally true that Batista's forces were not aggressive in offensive 
operations in the countryside; but this is not surprising considering the 
limited support available to them. In Vietnam, where government and allied 
forces had almost unlimited mechanical resources, the rule of thuni> was that 
a nUDDerical superiority of at least ten-to~ne was necessary to defeat the 
guerrillas. It is not surprising that Batista's army was unable to defeat 
Fidel's guerrillas with relatively fewer troops; they had less than a seven-to-
one edge over the rural insurgents.8 Still, Batista's army came close to trap-
ping and decisively defeating Fidel's forces as late as July 1958, and there 
were in Batista's army intelligent officers and officers with the will to fight. 
They failed in the countryside, but they didn't do so badly. 
Batista abandoned Cuba in the dark before dawn on New Year's Day 1959 not 
because he feared the urban underground--which was predominantly middle class, 
in contrast to the rural guerrillas, who were mostly lower class. Government 
forces had proven their efficiency in putting down urban uprisings and could 
still handle any internal threat to Havana. But there was no serious threat. 
Acts of sabotage or rebel terrorism in Havana decreased sharply in nuni>er and 
intensity in the second half of 1958. My impression--from association with 
underground personnel and independent observation on three visits to Havana 
during this period--was that counter-terrorism there by Batista's forces was 
also becoming increasingly rare. By the fall of 1958 most of the formerly 
active urban resisters seemed to be either in jail, in exile, or in the moun-
tains. Batis ta did not have to resort to police terror in Havana in the fall 
of 1958; he had the situation there well under control. It has been asserted 
that the rural guerrillas did not defeat Batista's army, but, in the words of 
one exile intellectual, "the latter surrendered only when demoralized by the 
results of a terrorism which formed the official response to violence in the 
towns • .,9 If this had been the case, Batis ta would have been overthrown in the 
spring of 1958, when underground activity and police repression in many cities 
and towns was intense, instead of in the following winter, when things were 
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quiet in Havana and most other urban areas. If Batista's soldiers were demor-
alized at the end of 1958--and they certainly were demoralized by this time~ 
they were demoralized by guerrilla action. And that is the name of the game: 
demoralize the enemy. It was a guerrilla war of moral attrition, and the 
rebels won. Our experience in Vietnam should give us a better understanding 
of this process. 
As it turned out, the Cuban bourgeoisie--which was really an international 
middle class, or eomp!r.a.do~ class, in that it functioned basically as an inter-
mediary between foreign business interests and Cuban producers and consumers--
was far weaker than its size would indicate. The same was true of Cuban 
organized labor, its ranks swollen by seasonal sugar workers, whose attitudes, 
if not actual residence, remained rural. Fidel Castro, with a sizeable armed 
force solidly supported by the rural masses, had no compelling need at the 
beginning of 1959 to truckle to the urban proletariat or to the bourgeoisie, or 
to accept the tutelage of Cuban intellectuals~of whatever class or ideological 
orientation. Fidel realized that the path to socialism was open, and that he 
could lead Cuba down that path on his own terms. The only possible obstacle 
was the United States. But the United States government in 1961, heavily laden 
with intellectuals--"the best and the brightest"--rnisread recent history and 
blundered into the Bay of Pigs. 
Today, in the aftermath of Vietnam, we seem to understand the world a 
little better than we did at the time of the Bay of Pigs. We appear to be 
more willing to accept the fact that even in small countries there can be 
developments which we cannot control, and should not try to control. Small 
countries do experience genuinely indigenous revolutionary or nationalistic 
movements. And they can generate really formidable power in their local area. 
Armed conflict in the "third world" is seldom, if ever, a matter of proxy war 
between world powers--Mr. Zbigniew Brzezenski's pronouncements on Cambodia and 
Vietnam notwithstanding. And when a former satellite of the United States, 
like Cuba, rejects our social, economic, and political system, it is not 
necessarily due to bad faith or treachery on the part of its leaders. In retro-
spect, we should be able to see that the Cuban Revolution was not the result 
of a plot or conspiracy, against us or against the Cuban people. It was a 
normal historical development. 
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